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Title: Mobility of PhYB1c:lrn ~ tntc Prepl.l~.a. Croup Heltlth 
Pro.ctlce: A Case St.udy. 
Th'.B thesis 1.~1 concerned "J'li~h chnnSeH:l ovex' time in th.) 
lihtch thGae: do(!tor~ l~avG occupied and on thair status) or 
rank. The ganorel Dxpectation 1a thnt both the rank and the 
The entr'r;.nco of p11Y81ciDE1s into prcp!llc1 g:r"OUP health 
2 
to be the most frui ttul fWUt'CO of hypothesos fOI' this study. 
Blau states that extrinsic reward" are the major incentives 
tor mobility and that intrinsic re~itu'da interact 1'11th 
extrinsio rewards in Influencing mobilIty. From these basio 
propositions tl'TO hypotheses "'lere generated: 1) As tho 
status of prepaid group health plans incl"easee, the status 
of physicians entering these plana will increaso. 2) As the 
statue of prepaId group health plans Increases. high statue 
reoruits will less frequently come from positions offering 
intrinsio revlsrds similar to those found 1n prepaid group 
plana. 
The design of this research 'Wa.s a longitud1na.l ceca 
study. Data \iere obtained relevant to one p:repE:.1d gr'oup 
health plan, the Portland Kaiser FoundatIon Health Plan. 
Th~ universe included 8.11 physicians \iho had pI'actlceo cUJ 
full-time, sale.rioa. staff 1n Kaiser at any t irne sinc$ 191~5 
"then Kai ser '!.1as first opened to the publi c. 
Inc1.icatcrs 'tlora obtained from various sources of da.ta.• 
The Kaiser perconnel reoor'c3 provided data. on physic1HTIS t 
6001£'.1 characteri otic 0. Data on tho statu!); of KD.~l ser CD.me 
.from an offi cial so.ls.ry e,chcdule ant1. records of pepsonnel 
advertlsementn. Informants vH:n~ lAs€(l to i"Elnk medical schools 
t::.nd tho AMA t s p-lx:££to!:l_~.t_~!?~·2.y'!lft_~.!l!t2.;·n£h~p.~L_?":~Q_.~~~!::. 
~~nc~cE!. provldccl a reI1klI1g of te~tChing hospitals. 
The evl{1ence fer." the f'i rat hypot hes1 s 't·ms gt:rl€l:t>ally 
negatl v(::. The dc!.t.:l 1ndj, C!lt t;c. th~tt althouf~h tho status of' 
Kaiser had increased. over the year's. the status of physi­
cians entering KrdAer had docl"E)(lsea.. This conolusion vIas 
reached on .the basis of f.1-ndings using prestige of med1cal 
school as an indicator for physic1ans' achieved status as 
well as findings usIng nationalIty and length of practice as 
indicators for their asoribed status. Thul\t the first 
hypothesis of this study had to be rejeot&d. 
The evidence for the second hypothesis lIas Inconclu­
sive: it Indioated that as the status of Kaiser Inoreased, 
the percentage of high status recruits fro~ certaIn posi­
tions with intrinsic reuards slml1ar to Kalser's decreased, 
whereas the peroentage from other positions increased. High 
status physIcians have la8S l"requently entered Kaiser 
a) having helo. posltiona emphasl zing the s~1. en tiflc a.spect (! 
ot care, b) having mem'bershtps 1n sotentlfic or specialty 
societies, c) having ohanged the location of their prllctlce, 
and d) having changed their specialty. They have mOl'e fre­
quently entered Kaiser a) having had postgraduate train1ng, 
b) having had at lea.st f1 va yc~.rs of trainlng, c) ha.ving hele' 
Jobs in bureaucra.tic contexts, d) having ~'£l,dua.ted from 
medical schools in the North Central a.nd \ve~tern states J and 
e) having engaged in t\tro or mora different types of act!v­
lties. In sum, it was unclear whether the second hypothesis 
should be accepted or rejected. 
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CHAl)TER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Common knol'lledge to tho observer of recent trenus in 
the medical profession is the controversy "1hich has taken 
place within the profession over the professional accep­
tability of pl'epaid group practice. In light of tho 
American Medical Association's (AMA'S) open opposition to 
prepaid group health plans) one might expeot that such plans 
would be regarded by many physicians as undesirable places 
topractioe. One might also expect such plans to expo;:'i­
ence difficulty in recruiting physioians. l 
A question arises as to hO"1 these barrier~ to reoruit­
ment might be overcome by prepaid group health plano. In 
other words, are these recruitment problems likely to he 
I 
, 
I 
long-term or short-term trends' Assuming that changes in 
the social characteristics of physiCians enterlng prepaid 
group health plans reflect changes in problems of recruit­
ment, one might also ask whether or not the kinds of physl­
cians ent ering prepaid gl"oup practice have val'led over time. 
Thl0 thesis is concerned ,,,ith the latter question regarding 
Variations in the types of physicians who enter prepaid 
lDannl s C. Mc~h"'ath, "Pe:!'spectiva fI.nd Participa.tion of 
Physioinn::: tn Prepaid Group l'raotice, II AS!!, XXVI (1961),
601, 603. 
I 
I 
I 

I 

I 
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,"I 
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2 'il 
group health plans. ilIii 
Thero are tl'1O rea.eons tor expeoting that prepa.id gl'CUp ,II 
health plans might gain acoeptan co within the medical pro-­ : I /' 
/ i 
fession and thereby solve their recruitment problema. It is I 
widely recognized that one of the goalr:; which has guided the 
establishment of all prepaid group health plans is to pro­
vide more efficient health cnre servioes. 2 Accordingly, it 
is possible that due to the increasing need for a more effi­
cient provision of health care, the demand for and accep­
tance of prepaid group plana will increase. A second goal 
of prepaid group plans has been the provision of hi&l 
quality medioal cere in all of the various areas of medi­
cine. 3 Accordingly t the possibili ty ar1 seB that prepaid 
group plune will gain acceptance by meeting the increasing 
pressure for high quality medical care to a greater degree 
than traditional forms. In achieving ~wccptance within the 
medical communlty, prepaid group plans would be ~xpected to 
over'como thell" I'Ewrultment diff10ul ties. 
In sum, there is reason to believe that the raoF~lt­
mont problems of preps,icl group practice represent: E!hOI·t-tsr·m 
rather ths.n long-t arm trends. Assuming that ohanges in tho 
2Ernest H. Sa\'Tard, 1<1.D. Janet D. Blank and Mer\'1yn R. 
Greenliolt, "Documentation of cI\Tcnty Years of bperation .and 
Growth of a Preosid Groun Praotice Plnn," Xcdical Care. VI 
(Me.y-June, 196~n, 232~ Edmund K. Faltermayer-;-1TBetter O~U'G 
at Less Cost \i1 thout }.ii racles, II E.2.!!~~' LXXXI (JantUlI....", 
1970), S2-g3, 126. 
;11 Giant Group Practice Bersds Ea at," ~ed'-£al_ W2!.;.1(~ 
News, November 1, 1965, p. 4S. F1altermayer, EO~~l'10j
LXXXI (January, 1970), S3, 126. 
3 
sooial charaoteristics ot rvcru1t;s refleot changasliln 
recruitment problems, then there is also reason to believe 
that the social characteristics ot physicians entering pre­
paid group health plans since their inception have system­
atically varied over time. Such variationpl'esent s a prob­
lem for research, namely, to 1nquire 1nto the direotion of 
and reasons for the variation. The task of the present 
thesis will be to "solve" th1s problem. 
A sooiological approach 't1ill be used to guide the 
presont research on variations in the social oharaoteristics 
ot physicians entering prepaid group practloe for two roa­
sons. First, manpot-/er, 1. e., p3I'sonnel, 1s an im.portant 
resouroe with far-reaching consequences tar any oolleotiv­
ity. Blau states that: 
Another distlnot1vo Ollal'8cteristic of intergroup
relations is that they involve mobilltJ of individ­
uals trom group to group. . • • The major patterns
of those movemento redefine the boundaries ot the 
eubstruot1.l!'OD in the.,macrostructure and modify thcil" 
internal stTuoturos.~
. 
In other words, changes in the personnel ot a given colleo­
tiv1ty affect the internal structure of the collectlvity as 
well as the relations bctlleen the colleotiTity and others. 
The first reason for the soc1ological epprv-B.ch of this 
thesis is that mvnpovior, or pel"sonnel, is 1m important 
sociolog1cal variable. 
4Pater M. Blau, Exoha.~and Potcler i.ro, Sooial Life 
(Nei'r Yor};:: John \'l1ley&-Sons, Inc., 19b4f; p. 295 
: III 
Iii 
'il 
,I 
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I 

4 
The second reason is that changes in the personnel ot 
a given collectivity may bo accounted for, at least in part, 
I 
I 
by sociological va,l"iables. Blau goes on to state that: 
liThe origin of these pattel"ns of mobility is aleo found in 
the int~rrelated status structures."S Accordingly, a socio­
logical approach should be capable of predicting the direo­
tion of and givlng reasons for varlations in the kinds of 
physiolans l"ho have entered prepaid group plans s1nco these 
plans w'ere first institutod. Therefore, this thesis \4111 
use euch an approach to describe and partit21ly aocourlt for 
variations in the social characteristics ot physioians who 
have entered prepaid group praotlce. 6 
I • PAST S'fUDIEB 
As stated above, the problem of this thesis 1s to 
describe and account tor variations in the types of 
5Ib1d. 
I 
6With the help of the classificatlon of hypothep;es
found in HcGinnls, the research obj ect1 ves of this thesic 
can be stated mOl'S precicely aa tolloi'IO: fInitely oondi­
tional hypotheses will be generated regarding variations in 
the soola.1. characterlstics of physlc1nns "tho have entered 
prepa.id group practi co. Such hypotheses \-rill not be purely
descript i ve, when th1 s t Elrm me all s that n • • • no condi t 1 ons 
are established regarding the relation of tbe variables under 
conSideration to llny other8. II Neither will they be purely
explanatory, when the t arID indicat as that II • • • conditions 
are speclfied for the variables x, 6 end an infinite number 
of variables Zi. n Rather, the hypotheses of this study will 
be finitely conditional, meaning that" ••• a condition of 
statistloal independence iA required betveen variables x, Y 
and a finlte numbor of othor variables zi, if the hypothe­liSiB is to be true. If Hobert HcGinnls, 'Randomization and. In­
ference in Sociological Research, II ASR, XXIII (195g), 11-11-412. 
5 
physicians entel'1ng prepa1d group practice. A numbel' of 
sociolog1cal concepts cun be used to approach this problem. 
From the perspeot1ve of the 1ndiv1dual we can speak ot 
mobility, wh1ch, 1n the broadest sense, can be def1ned as 
the "movement of persons • • • through the social struc­
ture. 17 Or, we oan talk of oaroers, 1.• a., typ1cal sequences 
'of movement among a set of posit1ons. From the perspective 
of the organ1zat10n (e.g., a group of physic1ans ln a pre­
pald group health plan) we can speak of reoruitment, 1.e., 
flll1ng poslt10ns wlth personnel accord1ng to a eet ot 
standards. 
The problem ,\,;i th whlchthis thesis deals has not bE~E:m 
ralsed before. The llterature on soc1al mobl1ity and re­
orultmentS has generally fooused on lntergcneratlonal OOCU­
pat10nal mob1li ty. Among such studies are t"10 which ooncern 
physlcians. Adams studied lntergeneratlonal occupationnl 
mobll1ty among physicians fro~ 1900 to 1950.9 Colomboto3 
presented data on the relation between tho Eoo10-oconomic 
status (SES) of a physiclE~'G family of origin {measured by 
7Ne11 J. Smelser and Seymour Nar-tin Lillset (eds.),
"Soc1al Structul"e, Mobillty and Development, SOQ.1el S~~g£.::. 
ture and MobllltL1n Economio Development (Ch1cago:---Aldine 
Fublish1ng-COr!ipany-;-I966T-;p-.2:---Se~l-aIso Blau, pp. 162-163. 
SStudies on recruitment need not be considered sepa­

rately from stud1es on mob1lity and cnreers sinco the re­

oruitment perspective is usually used in comblnation with 

either the mobility or career perspectiveo 

9Stuart Adams, "Trends ln Occupational Origins of 

Physicians," ASR, XVIII (1953), 404-409. 

6 
the SES of his father's occupation) and his ideology.IO 
This foous on inteTgenerat10nal ocoupatlonal mobility 
has pers1sted even though tbe conoept of mob111ty has been 
deflned ln more general terms and many other types of mob11­ I 
1ty, auoh sa lntro.genel"at1onal as \'lell as lnt ergenerat'.onnl, 
eduoational and geographl0 as well as ocoupatlonal, have 
been deemed worthy ot study. In support of a w1der focus 
wlthin stUdies on mob111ty, Wl1ensky states: 
The results afflrm the need for dlverslf1ed analysls

of so01al mobl1lty flttlng the d1versity of modern 

life. They underscore the wondrous varlety of phe­

nomena encompassed by "mobility,1J plao1ng 1nter­

generatlonal oocupational change ln perspectlve as 

one among a dozen types of movement.ll 

Follo\-11ng \vl1en£lky' S Buggestion, one can descrlbe the 
movement of physioians bet\<ieen different l'torlt oont ext s (c. g .. p Ii I 
solo practice, prepaid group practice, medical schools t hos- !' i 
pitals, and the publlc health service) as mobility in the 
broad Bcnse of movement through the soclal structure. How­
ever, it is not easy to identify the dimension or dimensions 
10John Colc,mbotos, 118001al Origins and Ideology of 
Physioians: A Study of the Effeots of Early Soclalization," 
Jour!}§!!_9!_~9alt!!_.~.!!.~~So£i~1 ~~ha.!lo~~) X OIm"oh, 1969),
Ib-:'29. It is Interes'Ging to note hot'l.the design of "hio 
etudy 8.110"lS him to ignore problel;1s raised by the d1versi­
f1oation of the medical profession. His samplo oxcludes 
temale physlclan8 as well as physioians on full-time salary(e.g., medical school faculty, full-time hoopital staff, and 
publio health physicians). He failo to mention that he has 
also excludod physioians in prepaid group practice. 
IlHarold L. Wilensky, "Measures end Effects of Mobil­
1ty,1I Sooial ~t!.'!:!£~uro_!!-!!Q 1>1obil!1l, cd. Smelser and Lipset, 
p. 110. 
7 
of mobility, if any, whioh this kind of movement entaila. 
Obviously this ohange does not involve ocoupational mobil­
ity--the physician remains a physician. However, it may 
lead to higher payor higher prestige for the physician and 
thus l'1ould 1nvolve vertical mobility (movement bett-leen posi­
tions in a status hierarchy). It may also involve geo­
. graphical mobility (change in location of residence) • 
-' ~';'FortunatelY, there are data which shed light on this 
definitional problem. Aocording to Wilensky, there are 
numerous systems of raruting along which mobility can occur, 
one of \-1bloh is the economic opportunities of ''1orklife .12 
In his faotor analysis of mob11ity he found that the choice 
between self-employment and working for an employer was one 
such opportunity. These findings suggest that the movement 
of physio1ans into solo versus prGpaid group practice 
involves one dimension of mobility, although they do not 
really tell us wast to name tna dimension. Thus, on an 
empirical baSis it appears legitimate to conceptualize the 
entrance of physioians into prepaid group plans in terms of 
mobility even though previous studies have not done so. 
Our reviel'l of the literature on social mobility has 
revealed that in foousing on only a few types of mobility, 
suoh studies ignore the conceptual problem rD.i sed by the 
movement of physicians a~ong different oontexta of work. 
l2Ibid ., pp. 119-111. 
g 
Llkel'riee, studies of phy siclans' careers have also ignored 
this kind of problem. HOi-lever', there appears to be no the­
oretical justification for their doing so. Definitions of 
the term career are often general. The notion 01' orderli­
ness and typicallty of a soquence of events are the major 
defining characteristics of the term rather than a notion of 
the context of the events forming the stages of a career. 
Therefore, there appears to be no a priori reason why a 
physician's "Job" history, i.e., a history of the contexts 
in which he has worked, would not conntitute part of his 
career. 
We may cite a variety of studies on physician's 
careers, none of which raise the k1nd of problem ~lith "1hioh 
we are concerned. In "The Stages of a l.fedlcsl Oareer" Hall 
describes the stages of a medical career as 1) generating 
8mbition, 2) ga1ning admittance to medical insti tut1ons, 
3) acquiring a clientele, and 4) developing colleague rela­
tions. l } Ho'tlever, although these ctages may be typ1cal for 
the pr1vate pract1t10ner, they w'ould not be typical for tho 
physician who goes into research or teach1ng, into the pub­
lic health service, or 1nto prepa1d group practioo. In the 
latter cnses the phys1cian either does not have a patient 
clientele or else h1s clientele 1s acqu1red automatically 
w1th his job. Thus, one shortcoming of Haills study 1s the 
l}Osl'lald Hall, liTho Stages of a Medical Career, II AJS, 
LIII (19t~g), 327. 
I; I 
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lack of typicality of the career stages which he has 
delineated. 
Another shortcoming of Hall l s study is his failul"'o to 
deal with the ohanges which may occur in a physioian's 
career after he has made his initial efforts to acqUire a 
olientele and develop colleague relations. It is possible 
that the physioian's later career 1s oharacterized by typ­
ioal patterns of practice in a variety of contexts. How'­
ever, Hall fails to raise the question of whether or not 
these ohanges constitute stages in s physician's oareer. 
In another study, IITypes of Medical Careers, tI Hall 
again ignores the kind of problem being rnised in this 
thesis. 14 He differentiates types of medical oareers along 
the dimensions of orientations to patients and to 001­
leagues. However, he does not indioate how different career 
orientations lead physicians to praotioe medicine in con­
texts varying, for example, in their degree of' bureau­
cratization or departure from tre.ditiona.l forms of praotioe. 
Studies on physioians I c8.reer~ alAo "lere made by 
Solomon15 and Liberson. 16 Solomon presents data on the 
l40s-.-rald Hall, II Types of r'iadical Oareers," AJ8, LV 
(1949), 243..;253· 
l5David N. Solomon, "Ethnio and Class Differences 
among Hospitala as Contingencies in Medical Oareers, II ~..E., 
LXVI (1961), 463-471. 
l6Stanley Liberson, tlEthnic Groups and the Practice of 
Medicine, II ~SR, XXIII (195g), 542-5lJ-9. 
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effect of ethnic and class differences among hospitals on 
physicians I careers. H0\1ever, he considel's only an early_ 
stage in the physioia.n I s career, nemoly, M.s tl~aining 
period. Liberson investigat as the effect fIlt' ethnicity on 
the spatial distribution and deg.t"oe of spmalization of 
physicians I practices. Thus, his study fmeuses on one oon­
textual aspect of physicians I practices. DIbt-T6Ver, he fails 
to consider tne effect of ethnicity on othel' cont extual fac­
tors, e.g., the degree of bureaucratizati~ of the context 
in which a physician l<lorks. 
Only one other group of studies is r~evant to the 
present research, namely, studies by Ben-~vid,17 McElrath;g 
8n<d Freidson, 19 which are specifically cOllC!erned with pre­
paid group practice. They all focus on th~ physician's role 
as it is modified in the prepaid group praetice setting and 
on the phys1cian's adjustments to these role changes. How­
ever, none of them have asked how physiciams come to prac­
tice in such a setting in the first plSC6!Od thus ignore 
the issue raised in this thesis. 
17J. Ben-DaVid, "The Proressional Role of the Physi­
cian in Bureaucratized Medicine: A Study 1m Role Conflict," 
Human Relations, Xl (l95S), 255-274.
- ... _- ... 
19l-1cElrath, ~SR, XXVI (1961), 596-609.. 
--
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II. 1'HEORY 
Earlier t1e discussed. aome commonly held viet1s on 
trends in the medical profession in light of the con­
sequenoes which these trends oould have tor prepaid group 
practioe. It \'TaS suggested that prepaid group plans had 
Overoome problems in recruitment and that the types of 
physioians entering prepaid group practice had varied over 
t1me. The objectives of tho present thesio were then 
defined as an attempt to describe and account fOI- var1­
ations in the social characteristicD of physicians who have 
entered pl'epe.1d group plans since their inception. 
Accordingly, we need a theory capable of goneratlng a 
set of operatlonal1zs.ble hypotheses ooncernlng changG3 itl 
the kinds of lndlvlduals enterlng prepa1.d. group health plano 
over time. As the follm"lng paragrapho uill show, it was 
found that struotural-fullction8.1 and social-psychological 
approaohe s failed to yield suoh hypo the see and thus '\'lere 
unable to dea.l '\ii th t he probl~Ym ot.' this thG!31s. In oon­
trast, Blou I e exchange theory in so fm..... a.s ~.t is l"elevant to 
social mobil1 ty and. reol'ui tment 1-laS found to pl."'oY1d.Q the lr.:lnds 
of hypotheses needod. 20 
20Blau, Exchan~nd. Power, pp. 294-301. Peter M. 
Blau, "The Flow or-Occupational-Supply and RecrUitment," 
ASR, XXX (1965), 475-~·90. 
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Alternative Structural-Functional and 
~££Iai~Psi~~~!ogi cal=!:.E:el·o~c~es~----~-
One example of a structur'ul-functlonal approach l'lhich 
fal1ed to yield useful hypotheses for this study Is the 
Davls-~foore theory of atl'atlfloation. 21 According to Davi s 
and Moore, one functicnal requirement of any soclety Is 
"placing and moti vating Indlvld.unls ln the so C1B.l struc­
ture. "22 The fulfll1ment of tll1s reql'l.ll"ement neccesl te.t es 
the availabl11 ty of appropl"iately motl va.ted and quallfled 
indivlduals to fll1 any vaoant posltions ln soclety. HOl/­
ever, such a pool of lndlvlduals ls not formed automatically 
when posltions are not deslrable or when they requlre exces­
sive tralnlng. Henoe, soclal stratif1catlon, the dlffer­
ential dlstribution of rew'ards to positions, oocurs to 
overcome such problems. 
In order to determine how the Davis-Moore theory re­
lates to the entranoe of physloians into prepaid group 
health plans, it will be assumed that at one time prepaid 
health plnns were regarded as undesirable places to prao­
tice.23 If one further assumes that a social system's 
21Kingsley Davls and Wilbert E. Moore, nSome Princi­
ples of Stratificatlon, 1\ 0l~~.L_~!~tu§..L_an~~£wer1_ Soc;!!:1.
Stratificatlon in Comuarative Persuect1ve, ea.JReinhara 
Eeoolx aoo-Seymour'Martln -'Lipset-[2ncreu.; New York: The 
Free Press, 1966), pp. 47-53· 
221bid. p. 47.
---- , 
23supra , p. 1. 
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functional reqUirements are being fulfilled (l.e., that the 
system ls functlonlng perfectly), then the Davla-Noore the­
ory say s that by offerlng re~"ards not provlded by other 
posltlons wlth slmilar tralnlng requirements, prepaid group 
health plana \'1111 be able to attraot e.pproprlately qualifled 
and motivated recruit a. Alternately, if one assumes that 
the system is not functionlng perfeotly, then one would 
expeot that inappropriately t~ained and motlvated lndlvld­
uals would enter prepaid group plens. 
However, we need a hypothesis about changes in 
reorultment over tlme. One oan be generated, of course, 
provided we can specify how well W'e expect the social sys­
tem to function. Howevel", thls \(ould be difficult, since 
the theory provldes no hypotheses about ohanges in the sys­
tem's funotloning. All lole kno't'i is that its funotioning is 
supposed to be reflected in the supply of recruits to posi­
tions. As a result, any hypothesis about changes in the 
funotioning of the system and correspondlng changes in 
reorultment patterns would be tautologlcal. Thua, the 
Davia-l>loore theory of stratification falls to provlde the 
kind of hypothesis needed in the present study. 
Merton and Kltt' a refe!'€mce group theory is nn example 
of a social-psyohologloal approach whioh mlght be useful for 
generating hypotheses about the kinds of physicians who 
enter prepald gl~oup prectlce. 24 One of the propositions in 
24aobert K. l-1el"ton and Alice 8. Klt"t II Contributions 
to the Theory of Referenoe G:....oup Be~vlor, ~ ~!ud!.es-.!.!L!he 
i 
this theory 1s that mob1l1ty 1s dependent upon the 1ndivid­
ual's conformity to the norms of the group to Which he hopes i i 
to ga1n admittanco. 25 In other words, mobllity is dependent 
upon the lndividual 1 s seleoting the members of this group as 
a referenoe group. In the case of pbys1cl,ans' entranoe into 
prepa.id group praotioe, one would expect that physioians ,·,ho 
conformed to the norms or prepaid group pra.ctice l'1ould. enter 
prepaid group plans more frequently than those who dld not 
conform. 
However, the hypotheses needed for the present study 
oonoern variations in reoruitment over time. In terms of 
Merton and Kltt's theory, we need hypotheses about changes 
over time 1n the kinds of individuale Who seleot prepaid 
group practitioners as a reference group. Unfortunately, 
Merton and Kitt are unable to account for the indiv1dual's 
seleotion of reference groups. Therefore, this theory, like 
that of Davis and }-1oore, is of limited value in dealil:g with 
the problem of this thesiS. 
In contrast, Blau I s exchange theory26 provides tho 
kinds of hypotheses noeded for this study. One of the basic 
------~----------------------~------
ScoEe _~d Metgod ot "Tpe _Americ~!l SQla.i~:,· ed. Robert K. 
~erton and Paul F. LazarsfeldirGlencoe, Illinois: The Free 
Pross, 1950), pp. 40-105. 
25!bid., p. g7. 
260ne of the basic propositions of exohe.nge theory is 
that complex social structures and processes cnn be 
--------
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propositions of exchange theory is that individuals and col­
lectivities follol'l the most profitable courses of action. 
Profit is defined in terms of the bala.nce between rel1ards 
and costs (i.e., resources gained and lost). Rel'larda can be 
of two basic types--extrinsic and intrinsic. Blau defineB 
them as follo't'/s: 
A critical analytical distinction is that bet\1Teen as­
sociations that are intI'insically re~rarding and those 
that furnish extrinsic benefits, which are, in pr1n­
ciple, detachable from the association itself•••• 
The basic differonce is between assooiations that are 
considered ends-in-themselven' by partiCipants an~7 
those they oonsider means for some further ends. 
In other '-Tords, to gain a particular intrinsio benefi t, one 
must be a member of a particular oolleotivlty; hOl-lever, to 
beneti t from a g1 ven ext riosi0 rel'lard, 1 t doe s not mat tor 
what collectivity one is in. Examples of intrinsiC rennrda 
are social acceptance and the fulfillment of the goals ot a 
given organization. Examples of extrinsic rewards are 
accounted for by simpler proaeIDses, namely those of 
exchange. In §xcha.M~~PO!,!£r., Blau def! nes e:slichange as 
1'0110,\,113 : 
Sooial exchange as here conoeived is limited to 
actions thl:lt are oontingent on relul.rdlng reactions 
from others and that cease when these expectod
reactlons are not forthcoming (p. 6).
The basic difference betl'Jeen exchange theory and the other 
theories "lhich we have consldsl"ed 11es In the partlcular
independent variable emphaslzed. In the Davis-Moore theory
of stratlficatlon 1 t "VlaS the notion of functional prol"equi­
sites of a soc'~e.l system; in the Mel~ton-Kitt theory of ref­
erence groups it was the individual's expectations or values 
held In accord \'lith his reference group. In Blau's exchange
theory it is the balance betiveen re\'1m"ds and costs which a 
partlcular course of action would entail. 
27Blau, !~ch~~g~~nd Po~er, pp. 35-36. 
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prestige, pOl1er, and money. The differontial distribution 
of extrinsic reT;lsrds defines the status, i. e., position in 
a ranking system, of an individual or oollectivity. 
Guided by the proposition that individuals and col­
lectivities follow the most profitable oourses of action, 
Blau develops a number of propositions on mobility and 
'recruitment which bear on OU1~ question of' the kinds of 
physioians who enter prepaid group pract1oe. We will first 
discuss propositions on the relationship of extrinsio 
rewards to recruitment: 
Successful competition provides more resouroes for 
rel'Tarding members and thus spells further succcss, 
since the greater rewards discourage mombers of the 
collectivity from defecting from it to others and 
encourage membgers of other colleotivities to leave 
them for it. 2 
This proposition states necossar.y conditions for 1) an in­
crease in the resouroos allocated to recru1tment by a col­
leotivity and 2) the recruitment of new members. Theoe 
conditions are described as "succossful competition." 
2SIbiq., p. 332. The render may find himself puzzled
beoause in this proposition and those that follo'l1 Blsu does 
not exp11citly state that he is discussing extrinsio rather 
than intrinsi c rel'fards. How'ever, if one bears in mind that 
extrinsic but not intrinsic re'\'lards are basic elements of 
ranking systems, then it is clear that the notion of extrin­
sic rather than intrinsic rC\'/arde is implioit in these 
propositions. For example, Blsu refers to increases in 
rewards. This implies that the value of these rewards sa 
1ncentives varies according to their quantity rather than 
their quality. HOllever only in the case ot extrinsio 
rewards is the size of the re\"lB.rd significant, and only by 
virtue of this fact 1s it poosible for this kind of reward 
to serve as a basis for ranking systems. Thus, it 1s clear 
that Blau 1s talking about extrinsic rather thnn intrinsic 
r e~J'.Ilrds • 
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The following statement clarities the nature of these 

conditions: 

Many groups and organizations also oompete for a 

domlnant position in the larger social structure, 

and sucoess in thls oompetitlon requires a flexlble 

internal status structure that permits an organized 

collectlvity to attract quallfied co~tributors by

rewarding them with superior status. 9 
Here these conditlons are described ln greater detal1 as suo­
cess ln the oompetltlon for a dominant pos1tion in the 
larger soolal structure. In other words, successful compe­
titlon 1nvolves an 1norease 1n status for a oollectlv1ty. 
The previous propositlon oan now be restated as follows: as 
the status of a oollect1v1ty inoreases, the rewards whlch 1t 
offers recruits will also 1ncrease. 
We turn now to several proposit1ons on the relation­
ship ot extr1nsic rewards to mobi11ty: 

Membership 1n various colleotivit1es is not equally

reuarding, "Thioh ls one factor that promotes mobility

bet\ieen them. • • • In terms of this factor alone all 
individuals have equal 1ncentives to move to the most 
rel'lardlng oQllectlvl ty in which thoy cnn find 
aooeptanoe.)O 
.In other ,\iorae, Blau suggest s tha.t fOl"> a. givan individual 
mobillty is dependent on his hav1ng the opportun1ty to 
receive b1gher reuc.rds. These oppol~tunitles 81"6 dependent 
on conditions stnted in the following propositlons: 
While 1nferlor status in a oollectivity gives mem­
bers most r~ason to want to loave it for a.nother, 
superior statue in it creates the greatest 
29±..£id., p. 292. 30Ibld. pp. 295-296.
--- , 
I I 
opportunities and potentialities for moving into 
another collectivity that promises higher rewards • 
• • • The middle stratum in a collectivity ••• 
tends to oonstitute its solld core of members who 
neither have much reason for wanting to leave it 
nor much tempting potential for dolng 80.31 
In other words, the opportunity to take advantage of higher 
rewards depends on the status of the ind1vidual beforo 
mobility: hlgh status gives an lndivldual a greater oppor­
tunity than eithor middle or 10''1 status. The follo'tfing 
propOSition is suggested: opportunities for higher rewards 
lead to mobility of high status (rather than low or middle 
status) individuals. 
The following two propositlons have been derlved from 
Blau' B theory of mobility and. recl'ui tment : 1) As the 
status 01' a collectlvity increases. the rewards which it 
offers recrults will also increase. 2) Opportunities for 
hlgher rewards lead to mobility of hlgh status individuals. 
With regard to variations over time in the kinds of physi­
cians entering prepaid group plans, the follot-ling hypoth­
esis is suggested: 
As the statue (rank) of prepnid group health plans
increases, the status (rank' of physiclans entering
these plans will increase. 
Thls hypothesls msy be further refined by distin­
guishing the various criteria, 1.e., achievement and 
ascription, Which govern the distl.·lbution of extrinsio 
rew'ards: 
3l~£!.~., pp. 296-297. 
I 
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As the status (rank) of prepaid group health plana 
increases, a) the achieved status of physicians
entering these plans will increase and b) their 
ascribed status will increase. 
Achieved statusos are those which are obtained by virtue of 
behavioral performances, such as competenoe. Examples are 
prestige, income, and pol-rer. Ascribed statuses are assigned 
by virtue of the situation of one's birth: examples are age, 
sex, race, and territorial location. 32 
It was stated above that extrinSic rewards are basic 
components of ranking systems. 33 As suCh, they serve as I I 
incentives for mobility. In contrast, intrinsic rewards 
are not basic elements of ranking systems. Nevertheless, 
they are associated with any given status, i.e., soclal 
positlon. Thus, intrinsic re';'1B.rds may also serve as incen­
tives for mobility. 
Intrinsic re,...,arda vary in the degree to tihich they 
serve as incentives for mobility depending on the exper1·:.·· 
ence which an individual has had with these rewards in 
other positions. Blau states that: 
These expeotations of sooi8.l rel'l'ards, in turn, are 
based on the past social experience of individuals. 

• • • The study of cxohan go processes in social 

assooiations must take into account the ways in 

which the values of the rC\1ards being exchanged are 

modified by the expectations of the participants

and, ultimately, by the previous dlstrlbij~iOn of 

rewards that governs those expectations.' 

32Smelser, p. g. 33suEra, p. 16. 

34:s1au, ~~~_an~PO't!~.;:, pp. l43-lIt1t. 
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In other words, intrinsic rewards serve as incentives for 
mobl1ity dependlng on the stntus (position} of the lndl­
vldual. Accordingly, one might expect that the kinds of 
intrinsic rei'lards received in prevlous statuses sffect the 
kinds of 1ndlviduals who are mobl1e. 
However, before we can specify a hypothesis relatlng 
mobility to lntl'insic retutrds, we must consider how 1ntrin­
sic rewards lntel'act \11 til extrinsic rCi'iarda ininduc1ng 
mobility. The problem is that either extrinsic or lntrin­
sic rewards, or both, may serve as incentives for mobility 
1n any particular situation. Therefore, it 1s neoessary to 
specify the relationship between them. 
According to Blau, extrinslc rel'lB.rds are the most 
s1gnificant factors affecting mobl1i ty. 35 Jloi~ever, they do 
not account for all instances of mobl1lty. Therefore, one 
m1ght expect, for exa~pleJ that the entrance of high statue 
1ndividuals into a collectivity offering felT extrinsio 
rewards could be accounted for 1n terms of intrinsic 
rewardS, more specifically in terms of the slmilarlty 
betl'leen the lntrinslc rei-lards of the indlvidual' B past and 
present po sl t 10ns • Accordlngly, the fo 11ol71ng hypothesls 
is suggested! 
As the status (rank) of pl~epaid group health plans
increases, hlgh status recl"ults \<1111 less frequently 
35Blau, "0ooupatlonal Supply and RecrrJll tment, II ~SR, 
XXX (1965), p. l~gg. 
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oome from statuses (social positions) with intrinsic 
rewards similar to thoRe found in prepaid group plans. 
Examples of statuses (pooi tions) \171 th intrinsic rewarda com­
parable to those of prepaid group practice are pract1ce 
w1thin an organ1zational setting 1nvolv1ng the centra11za­
t10n of facilities and pORitions involving Bcience-or1ented 
rather than praotice-oriented activities. 
In sum, Blau's exohange theor,y has enabled us to gen­
erate the kinds of hypotheses we need regarding variations 
1n the k1nds of physicians who have entered prepa1d group 
practice. They are as followa: 
1) 	As the status (rank) of pre~a1d group health plana
1ncreases, the status b'nnk} of physicians entering 
these plano will increase. 
a) The achieved status of these physicians will 
1ncrease. 
b) The ascribed status of these pbysicians will 
1ncrease. 
2) 	As tho status (rank) of prepaid group health plans 
lncreases, high status recruits will less fre­
quently oome from statuses (positions) with intrin­
ale rewards similar to those found in prepaid group 
plans. 
CHAPTER II 
METHOnOLOGY 
I. SOUROES OF DATA 
Two sources ot infonlstion on the kinds ot physioians 
who enter prepaid group praotioe are the personnel records 
ot physioians employed in the Portland Kaiser Foundation 
Health Plan and the A..'.1A I a ~!oan Medical .D!!.:Qotorl. As 
sources of data tor this study, eaoh haa its advantages end 
disadvantages. The !1~dioa~ D!r~ct2.!:l would provide tor a 
comparison of physioians entering prepaid group praotioe 
with those entering prlvate practioe. Suoh a design tfoula. 
faoi11 tate the int erpretation of findings by alloldng fOl' 
controls on some of the faotors \,Ihich might a,ccount tor the 
results. 
However, there is one serious disadvantage to the 
data in the Medi£~.!._Dire~~~!:y": it contains only a fet., 
1tems of information on eaoh physician. In oontrast, the 
peraonnel records of Kaiser physioians contain information 
on several possible indioators for eaoh of the variable~ 
whioh have been mentloned so tar, namely, the status of 
Kaiser, the status Of physicians, and their past social 
positions. Therefore, in spite of the fact tha.t the per­
sonnel records of Kaiser do not allow a. oomparison or 
23 
prlvate to prepaid group practitioners, these records were 
chosen as a source of data. 
II. DESIGN 
The lmpllcatlons of the cholce to use the personnel 
records of the Portland Kalser Foundation Health Plan as a 
souroe of data are eVldent in the research design of thls 
study. Flrst, although the hypotheses of thls study con­
cern all prepald group plans) the data oover only one pre­
pald group plan. In other wOI'ds, the design lnvolves a 
case study. As a result, no tests of hypotheses are pos­
slble. Second, since the data concern only some prepald 
group practltloners but no prlvate practitioners, the de­
slgn lacks a oontrol group. As a result, the hypotheses of 
this study are only partlally explanatory. Thlrd, the 
kinds of data which can be extracted from the Kalser per­
sonnel records are for the most part nomlnal and ordlnal 
data. Thls sets llmltatlons on the methods whlch can be 
used to present and analyze the data. 
Universe 
As stated above, although the hypotheses of this 
study refer to the universe of all prepllid group praoti­
tioners, the data cover only the univerBS of physlcians ln 
one prepald group health plan. More specifically, the 
unlverse of' the present study includes all physlclans who 
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have praoticed as tUll-time, Eslarled statf in the Portland 
Kaiser Foundation Health Plan at any time sinoe World vTar II. 
Such physicians are dosignated "active staft" within 
Kaiser and are distinguished from the courtesy and consult­
ing stafts, as well as the preceptees (residents). Further­
more, they include only physicians who practiced in Kaiser 
after it had been opened to the public in 1945, regardless 
of whether these physicians entered Kaiser before or after 
1945. It does not include physicians who practiced there 
exclusively during the war years, 1942-45, when the Kaiser 
Foundation Health Plan ""!as :run on a striotly emergenoy, 
war-time baeis. In light of the differenoe between the 
oontext tor practioe whioh Kaiser presented during the war 
and that "'hioh .1 t represented after the ~;ar, it seems 
likely that the Characteristics of the latter physicians 
would bo difforent from those ot the former, who practioed 
in KRieer after the war. 
Since the uni verse involves only one oase of a pre­
paid group health plan and since the data in this case spun 
the period of time bet~/een its inception and the present, 
the desl~l of the present research is a longitudinal case 
study. Strictly spealcing, no test s or hypotheses oan be 
made in such s study, since a test investigates the extent 
to Which an hypothesis holds in all the cases of the uni­
verse to whioh the hypothesis reters. As a result, the 
generality or the conclusions which can·:.,be dratm from the 
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present study is severely limited. The similarity between 
the Kaiser Health Plan in Portland and other cases of pre­
paid group practice will merely be assumed. 
Controls 
S1noe the universe of the present study conta1ns only 
prepaid group practitioners in Kaiser, the researoh design 
lacks n control group of private pract1tioners. Further­
more, since the controls which are used refer almost exclu­
sively to characteristics of prepaid group pl~actitioners 
rather than private practitioners, the etfects of certain 
exogenous factors on the findings of this study cannot be 
ruled out. An example Of such an exogenoae variable is 
changes in the composition of the medical profession. This 
variable, rather than changes in the status of Kaiser, may 
account for the changing attributes of Kaiser physioians. 
However, without a control on this exogenous variable, 1t 
would be difficult to rule out its effect. As long as 
important factors remain uncontrolled witb respect to the 
r~pothesis of this study, this study can ooly partially 
account for the changing chllracteristlcs 0'1 physicians 
enter1ng Kaiser. 
The controls used in this etudy involve character1s­
tics of prepa1d group practitioners ~'lbich 5'llght have a 
bearing on their mobility patterns. These controls were 
chosen aocording to t"10 crj.. ter1e.. The first control, on 
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Aotive/inactive staft status, was chosen beoause it was a 
mobi11ty variable which, aa suoh, mighthnve an effeot on 
the mobility of physicians into Kaiser. 
Active-inactive staff status indioates l'Thether a 

physioian who entered Kaiser is still practicing there or 

Whether he has Since left. It seems plausible tnat this 

. val'lable might be related to the kinds of physicians who 
are responsive to the changes in the extrinsio rewards of 
Kaiser wh10h presumably accompany changes in Kaiser's 
status. T,.,ro w'ays in ,\i'hich this might oocur are: 1) Inac­
tive staff might represent physioians 1'1ho both came to and 
lett Kaiser in search of higher extrinsio rewards; active 
staff might have remained in Kaiser because of its intrin­
eio rel'lards. 2) Active staff may have remained in Kaiser 
because of the increasing extrinsic rewards which it prom­
ised, whereas inactive staff may have left because of its 
unsatisfactory intrinsic rewards. 
Other controls used in the present study are achieved 
and ascribed status. They were chosen because theoret­
ically they represent t,\ITO aspect s of status, or rank, and 
as such, one would expect them to be interdependent. 
The first hypothes1.s of this study that 
as the status of prepaid group health plans increases, 
a) the achieved status of physicians entering these 
plans will increase, and b) the ascribed status ot 
these physicians will inorease. 
is based on tho assumption that the achieved and ascribed 
aspects of status co-val'Y. However, they may be inversely 
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related. In any case, because of the supposed interrela­
tion of these variables, controls are necessary. Accord­
ingly, controls on ascribed status were used in the hypoth­
esis on the increase in the achieved status of Kaiser 
physicians, and conversely, in the hypothesis on their 
ascribed status, a oontrol on achieved status lias used. 
Due to the small size of the universe of Kaiser 
phYSicians (N - l4~), it was practical to place only one 
oontrol at a time on any hypothesis. As a result, the 
interrelationships among the independent, dependent, and 
more than one control variable could not be determined. With 
any degree of stability in the data. It was also imprac­
tical to place any controls on the second hypothesis con­
cerning intrinsic rewards. This hypothesis, involving 
three variables, in effect already utilized one control 
variable. 
The variables "i'lhich could be obtained from the Koiser 
personnel records were moetly ordinal and nominal vari­
ables. Aocordingly, methods approprie,te for these kinds of 
varlr~bles ,.,ere chosen to present and analyze the data.. 
Ol'oas-tabulation is uaed to preaent the find.ings tor tho 
hypotheses and to introduce controls in the analysiD of the 
data. G-aroma is used to measure the esnociat1on J bet,\,lcen 
ordinal Variables. 
The way in wh1ch the tables were set up csn best be 
expla1ned step-by-step. The first step was to determ1ne 
the direction and t1ming of vll.riatj.ons in the independent 
variable, the status of Kaiser. In other words, the years 
which could serve as cutting points had to be determined. 
Because of the small size of the universe of Kaiser physi­
. cians, the decision was made to look at variations in the 
status of Kaiser in terms of lO~l, medium and high status 
periods, rather than to look at such var1ations year by 
year. Three time periods, rather than two, were chosen to 
avoid losing too much information through collapsing. 
The second step was to decide on the sampling of 
phySicians within these time periods. As stated in the 
hypotheses, the focus of this study is on the changing 
ch~racteristics of physicia.ns "Tho enter Kaiser rather than 
on the changing characteristics ot the lthole Kaiser staff. 
Therefore, physioians will b~ sampled according to the year 
in which they assumed active-staff status in Kaiser, such 
that three samples will result: physicians who entered . 
Kalser during the first, second, and third time periods. 
The table setup can nmIT be brietly summarized. The 
independent variable, the status of Kalser, is broken dO\'ln 
into low, medium, and high status periods. The dependent 
variable may involve anyone of a variety of characteris­
tics or phYSicians indicative of either their status or the 
intrinsic rewards associated with their past positions. 
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Physicians are sorted on both independent and dependent 
variablos, e.g., on the status of Kaiser in the year that 
the physicians entered Kaisor, end on their achieved status. 
III. INDICATORS 
As stated above, the problem of this thesi s 1s to 
account for variat10ns over t1me 1n the Itinds of physicians 
recruited into Kaiser. The analysis of this problem focuses 
both on the status of Kaiser and on the status of physicians 
who enter Kaiser, i.e., the proportions of physicians with 
h1gh and low status and the proportions coming from posi­
tions with intrinsic rewards similar to and different from 
those of Kaiser. Thus, the var1ables for which indicators 
are needed are the status of Kaiser, the status of physi­
cians, and social positions offering intrinsic rel1ards 
similar to those of Kaiser. 
Statue of ~hysician! 
Indicators for the status or rank of physicians 
include indicators for both their" achieved and ascribed 
statuses. Two asoribed statuses of physicians are 
nationality and length of practice. Within the context of 
the present study, the country in which a physician's med­
1cal school is located serves as an indicator of hie 
nationality (i.e., nation of birth), since the former vari­
able appes.red to be almost perfectly correlated with the 
I 
I I 
I I 
I I 
I I 
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latter. Information on location of medical school and 
length of practice is reported in the Kaiser personnel 
records. 
•One kind of achieved status is prestige •. The present 
study includes three indicators for a physioian's prestige: 
the prestige of his medical sohool, the prestige of his 
hospitals of internship and residency, end the prestige of 
his references. 
The theory behind the first tl'lO 1ndicators is clearly 
stated by Wheeler: 
Clearly, an important tie fbetween an organization and 
a recruit's later oareer] in the status of the organi­
zation in the eyes of the oommunity. • • • Thus, ...ThcI'C­
ever the indiv1dual's reputation is at stake, bis 
past membership identities beoome cr1t1cal referenoa 
pOints, quite apart from his spec1fic aocomplishments 
01' misdeeds wh1le in the organizat1on.l 
This suggests that measures for the prestige of physicians' 
medical sohools and hOGpit~~s of internship and residency 
can ~erve as indicators for physioians' prestige. 
Two different methods ere used in the present study 
to secure the necessary rankings of,medical sohools and 
hosp1talu. A group of 1nfonnants was selected to rank 
medioal schools. In theory, this ranking should serve as 
an ind10ator for the reputation or prestige of various 
medicsl 80110010 ";~cthin the medicsl profession. 
lStanton Vfueeler, "The Struoture ot Formally Organ­
ized Sooialization Settings," Soo1B.l!~!lti0!L.After Ch1l~~£od: 
Two ESf5:A,VS, Ox-ville G. Brim, Jr. and Stanton V/heeler rNa,-,
Yorlt:-tclhn \l111ey &: Sons, Inc., 1966), p. 96. 
;1 
Following Ford, the ranking of hospitals of intorn­
ship and residency is based. on the official AMA rating of 
suoh hospitals. 2 Accord1ngly, a high-status hospital is a 
major teach1ng hospital, i.e., a major unit in the teaching 
program of an affiliated Bchool. A middle-ntatue hospital 
is a minor teaching hospital, wnioh 1s aff1l1ated w1th a 
med1cal school but wh1ch is used only to a 11m1ted extent 
ln the SChool's teach1ng program.} All other hoap1talo, 
1.e., non-teaohing hosp1tals, are oalled low-status 1100­
p1tals. The data on th1s rating were seoured from the 
A:tI.A' s Dlre9t orl of ~E£;:~~~....!!lt ernShiE!!-.!!!£...Re ~id~~, 
and the data on physicians' hospitals of internship and 
residency and medical sohools came from the personnel rec­
oras of Kaiser. 
The third indicator for a physician' a status is the 
prestige of hlos references. It is based on the assumption 
that like past organizational affiliations, references 
serve as symbols for an individual's prest:tge in situat10ns 
\-lhere more intimate know'ledge of the 1ndividual's past in 
unavailable. In other words, the prest1ge of an individ­
ual's reference 1s used as an indicator for the individual's 
2Amasa B. F'ord et al. The Doatol" a PersQective: 
Pbys1£~!ills Vim:! th~!.r-~~Ie!!.~§:=~!!£-rr:ac!!ce-rCleveland: 
TIiePreas of Case i~e8tern Reserve Universi ty, 1967), 
pp. 116-11g. 
}American Medical Associat1~n, D!.t~cto~~Qf.~n2roved
IntcrnshiQB nnd ResldencieR 1291:6S (Ohicago:-~mer1can 
Medicar-Assoc1atIon;-r9orr;-p. -71:­
i I 
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prestige. Accordingly, in the present study the prestige 
of a physician1s references 1s used as an indicator for his 
status. 
The prestige of a reference was inferred from the 
prestige of the orgsnizatj.on with which he was affiliat ed 
during the time he knew the physician whom he recommended. 
Accordingly, high-status references have affiliations with 
medical schools or with major teaching hospitals. Middle­
statuo references are affiliated with minor teaohing hos­
pitals. All other references are designated low-status 
referenoes. The sources of datn relevant to this indicator 
were the personnel reoords of Kaiser end the ~ire£!£~y of 
~Ero!ed_In~r~~~!E!~~~Res!£~rrcieB. 
Within the oontext of the present study, direot 
indioators were lacking for the intrinsic rewards of Kaiser 
as well as for the similarity of the intrinsic rew'ards 
associated with Kaiser and other positions. Therefore, the 
indicators for physicians l past 90cia1 pOSitions having 
intrinsic relfards eimilar to those of Ka,iser are indirect 
rather than direct. 
Data on the intrinsic rewards of prepaid group prac­
tice were found in printed statements In!\de by physioiana 
about prepaid group practice. Examples of auch intrinsic 
reuards are the tollo\']ing: the opportunity to practice 
I 
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more scientifically and the opportunity to further onets 
education. 4 These printed statements were used beoause 
they involved the peroeptions and vB,lues of physioians con­
cerning prepaid group praotice. As such, they should indi­
cate the intrinsic rettards of Kaiser as perceived by 
potential Kaiser recruits, given the tollol'ling assumption: 
lacking experience With the actual rel'/ards of Kaiser, these 
recruits would be likely to evaluate Kaiser in terms of pro 
and oon statements made by other physicians about prepaid 
group practioe. 
Other kinds of intrinsio rewards were identified 
which, although they may not be reoognized as such by 
physioians, may predispose physioians to enter Kaiser. It 
was assumed. that various aspects of the situa.tion of tho 
Kaiser recruit or staff member are intr1nsically re't~art1irlg. 
Examples of suoh intrinsic re\"larda are the opportunity for 
more oonvenient acoess to faOilitles,5 the opportunity for 
4G• W. Hunter, M.D., "Join1ng, II The Ph.:ls~c:1~1rl 
Gro~:Q.1:.~tic~, ed. Ed,\Y'1n P •. Jordan, lLD~Chicugo: ~rhe 
Year!30ok Publ1shers, Inc., 1958), pp. 41-1i2. 
5Ryack also recogniz.es the adva.nta.ge of convenient 
access to facillties in the s1 tUatlon of the prept~1d g:c."oup
praotit1oner:
There are a number of potential advantages to group
practioe: the poo11ng of the skillS of a number of 
speo1alists to serve the spec1al needs of the pa­
t1ent; salutary effects of the doctor being subject 
to observation by his peers; easy access to the 
servioes of specialists at little or no add1t1onal 
oosts; lower oosts through pooling of capital
investment; stabilized 1ncome for the dootor as he 
shares 1n the total reoeipts of the group; fuller 
r 
I 
I 
~ i I 
, 'I 
a change, and the opportunity to live in the West. 
Positions or sets of positions characterized by 
intrinsic rel~ards similar to those of Kaiser were identi­
fied in the sa~e manner as the above-mentioned rewards of 
Kaiser. In light of oertain aspects of the structure or 
situation ot these positions, it was assumed that they 
offer rewards similar to Kaiser's. For example, the posi­
III 
tion of postgraduate student, like that of the Kaiser 
physician, provides the intrinsic reward of the opportunity 
for more education. Other examples are listed below (For 
more detail on these indicators, see Tablen XVII-XXVI): 
I 
Intrinsic Rewards 
--9fKafs~-
Opportunity for more edu­
cation 
Opportunity to provide 
more sc1entifio cara 
Opportunity for mOl"'e con­
venient acoess to 
facilities 
Opportunity to live in 
the West 
Opportunity for a change 
I'POSitions Offering ill -SimlIir-Re~! il 
Postgraduate student iCareer involving extensive 
training !Speoialty or scientific society
memberships
Previous position emphas12'ing
scientific rather than c11n­
ical aspeots of care 
Career 1n bureaucratic oontext 
Medioal school student in the 
West 
Career of changes in speoialties
Career of chengeo in location II 
ot practioe
Career of changes 1n aotivities 
I I 
, I 
use of ancillary per-sonnel a~d eqUipment. 
Elton Rayack, !:~Qfes81o!}fll ~~mer and Amer!!!Rn Hedlcine: The 
Economics of the American Hcdioal Association {meveland:
The-WarId-Pub11shing Company-,19brr;-p.--I5o.­
----------
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Status of Ka1ser 
~~~~!!!E~J.._5>..!l~_beh!.nCL.~!!£_In9.i c~!2~. In the present 
study there are t'HO 1ndi cators for the status of Ks1 s.er. 
One 1s the ratio of unaccepted applicants to staff posit10n 
open1ngs 1n Kaiser. Another 1s a comparison of the rates 
of 1ncrease over time 1n the atar·t1ng salar1es of Ka1ser 
spec1a11sts to the rates of 1norease 1n the 1ncomes of 
self-omployed phys1cians under sixty-f1ve in the Un1ted 
States. 
The f1rst 1nd1oator 1s based on the follow1ng assump­
t1ons: 1) As the status of a collectiv1ty.1ncreases, the 
demand for 1 t s job open1ngs \,1111 11kew1se increase. 2) The 
demand for these open1ngs 1s reflected 1n the ratio of job 
applicat10ns from 1ndividuals who take jobs elsewhere to 
job open1ngs. 3) In turn, th1s rat10 1s reflected 1n the 
rat10 of d1scont1nued job 1nquir1es to job openings. S1nce 
the Kaiser records on d1scontinued job 1nquiries were 
available, it \'las feasible to use the ratio of unaccopt ad 
app11cants to staff position open1ngs as an indicator for 
the status of Kaiser. 
The second indicator is based on Bleu's theory of 
mobility nnd recruitment. According to Blau, changes in 
the status of a oollectivity involve changes in the amount 
of resources which are used to reward both new and old 
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members. 6 Starting salaries, which reflect the a'Dount of 
resources allocated to rew'arding nett members, can then 
serve as an indicator tor the status of a collectivity. 
Therefore, in the present study the rate of increase (or 
decrease) in the starting salar1es of Kaiser physic~.ans 1s 
used as an indicator for the status of Ka1aer. 7 
Since status refers to a position in a ranking sys­
tem, the status of any given collectivity is relative to 
the status of private pract1ce as well as to the status ot 
other segments of the medicol profession. Therefore, indi­
cators for statue, such as the rate of increase in starting 
salaries and the ratio of unaccepted applicants to staff 
position openings, should bo expressed in relntive rather 
than absolute terms. 
However, datn on the demand for the position of pri­
vate practitioner, whioh might have been used to stand.ard­
ize the data on the demand for positions in Ka.iser, lv"er~ 
not available, although data on the income of pr1vate prac­
gtitioners were. Therefore, the present study includes one 
6~Era, pp. 16-17. 
7Data on the starting salaries of Kaiser physicians 
wero sccured from the Financial Division of Kaiser and from 
the records of personnel advertisements. 
gThe following sources of data on the 1ncomes of pri­
vate practitioners were used in the present study: Physi­
cians' Enrnln~ and Exrrenses: A Regrint of Articles-Sasea 
on--nT1edr£~l ~£of0sIC8T·.~=Qon~Irr~r5:Er~urV~Y-~-r22Q\oraMI~
N:-J.: Medical ,li";conomics, Ino., 19 OJ; 'l'llesults of Medical 
~2!!.0mi£~ I :[l"irst Annual Checkup of Physlcians I EconomIc 
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absolute and one relat1ve indioator for the status ot 
Kaiser. 
In stand.ardizing the data on the starting salaries of 
Kaiser spec1alists with respect to comparable data on pr1­
vate practitioners, 1t would have been desirable to have 
data on the beginning incomes of speoialists in privata 
.practice. However, due to the lack of such data, it was 
necessary to use data on all private praotitioners under 
sixty-five and to assume that '\'lithin the context of the 
prescnt study the latter data would be representative of the 
tormer data. 9 Accordingly, the second indicator for the 
status of Kaiser involved a longitudinal comparison of the 
starting salaries of Kaiser specialists to the incomes of all 
self-employed physicians under Sixty-five. 
----~----------------..----------.-------.------­
Health, II !1edica!..~c2n~ll~, November 2, 1964, pp. 61-107; 
and Elton Rayaok, ~~Of~~sional P<2i'!Q!:_~d A~~icall1ied~Q.ln!. 
It should be noted that Rayack had access to unpublished data 
from the Quadrennial and Continuing Surveys conduoted by the 
Journal ~e~iQ~~.~9Qnomi£~. The data reported in Ehlsic~ansl 
~!rninga_~nd EX2eI]s~~ and "Physiciana' Economic HoaltfiTr also 
come from those surveys. 
9ActuallY, the data on all private practitioners may
be of just as great utility as that on beginning self­
employed specialists. Although the absolute size of the 
incomes of these t,\,10 gl''Oups of physicians "is undoubted.ly dif­
ferent (aee Table XXVIII, Appendix B), the rates of increase 
1n their incomes may be the same. 
Data relevant to this problem show that the rates of 
increase in the income of speCialists as compared. to thnt 
of all physicians were not identioal during two different 
periods, 1951 to 1959 and 1962 to 1963. During the earlier 
period specialists' incomos increased less rapidly than 
those of all physicians (at rates of 5.6 per cent and g.5 
per cent per year, respectively. In contrast, during the 
later period specialists 1 incomes increased more rapidly
than the inccmeo of a.ll phy s1 c~_ans (at rat os of 5.5 per 
cent and 3.1 per cent, respectively). Nevertheless, the 
The method used to make this oomparison was first to 
express the inoome dats in terms of percentage inoreases. 
They were then interpI'ctec1 as follol.,S: If the rate of in­
crease in the starting salary of the Kaiser specialist 
exoeeded the rate of 1ncrenGo 1n the income of the private 
praotlt ~.oner, then 1 t was inferred that the status of Kai­
Bel" had increased. Conversely, if the rate of increase 1n 
the private practitioner's income exoeeded the rate of 
increase in the Kaiser salary~ then it was inferred that 
the status of Kaiser had decresoed.10 
possibility remains that the difference betWeen the rates 
of increase in the inoc~es of beginning pl~siclanB and all 
physicians m1ght offset the differencos between epecialiate
and all physicians. Unfortunately, we have no available 
data relevant to th1s p050ibility. 
The source for the 1951-59 rates mentioned above 1s 
~hl.£!..Q.!~ll!!~_~art!.~ng~_~nd_ExE~~S~, pp. 9, itt. The 1962-63 
rates are found in PhysiciansT Economic Health," ll.edl CEll 
Economics, November 2, 1964, p. 105. _..w 
------
___ 
lOAnother method could have been used to compare the 
data on sta.rting salaries of Kaiser specialists to the data 
on incomes of private practitioners. ~he data could havo 
been expressed as percentage differences. When the peroent­
nge difference between the Kaiser salary and the pr'lvate
practitioner's income decreased (given that when the first 
difference was computed, the Kaiser salary was lower than 
the private prE.l.ct1tioncr's income),lt would hEl.ve been 
inferred that the status ot Ka1ser had incpeased. Conversely,
when the peroentage difference increased, it would have been 
lnferrecl tha.t Kaiser's status had de(~reascd.
The difference bet\<1een this alternative and the on;;, 
chosen can be quickly grasped \.;hen expressed in symbols. 
Let 81, s2, ••• Ci represent the salary of the Kaiser spec1al­
1st at RuccesBivc pOints in time. Similarly, let 11, 1~, ..• 
i1 represent the income of the priva.te practitioner at the 
same points in time. Accoro.ing to the method of comparison
chosen for th1s study) the status of Kaisel" is said to in­
crease \'then 
i2 - 11
-"'_..-._.................
> i1 
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Given increases and decreases in the statuB of Kaiser 
over time, per10dw when the status of Kaiser was low, 
middle, and high \vere 1nfel~r'ed on the follorring basis: The 
period when the gap betHcen the rates of iner'ease in the 
1ncomes of Kaiser physicians and private pr-act1tloners was 
the greatest was des1gnated a per10d of either low or high 
status for Kaiser, depending on whether the rata of increase 
was hlg,.1.el~ for Kaiser physicians or for private practi-
tioners. Kat ser 'VIas said to ha va middle status rlhen the gap 
was the smallest. 
!2~:t a _.2~2:.!.!:~t _¥!!}2:~~ t ~£-K2.L Kal..§,~r' s_f:!~ tu~. • The 
data for the first indicator of the status of Kaiser show 
ths.t the status of Kaiser hae incl'lce,sed over time. Ts.ble I 
gl ves tht: ratios of unaccepted applicant tJ to staff P:;f:\j, tion 
--.--.... ----------..... ----------------.----.------....------~-_______ .~b·_"._._,_,_ .. """_ ... ...::<,. 
given that both 8 and 1 have been steadily increasing Over 
time. According to the alternative method, the statu~! of 
Kaiser is sald to increase when 
11 - 8 1 
81 > 
12 - 82 
62 
given that 11 j.B greater than sl-
Tho second method of comparison was not chosen because 
It :tnvolves tIH) ltssumption that o,n inorement of, for G.x:ampl{'!, 
$1000 in the income of f! prl vt\t e practj.t 10ner '-S equal to a 
$1000 raise in the salary of a Kolser spcclallnt. It would 
have been inappropriate to make such on Rosumption within the 
context of the present study because Kaiser physicians re-
ce-:lve bonuses nnd other fringo benci'i ts. rrhUB, Kaiser 8alt~.ry 
data do not reflect the absolute size of the income of tho 
Kaiser specialist. As a result, the absolute size of an 
increment 1n his oalary is not directly comparable to a.n 
equal increment in the lneo~ile of a private practitioner. 
For mo~e details on the problems 1nvolved in compar-
ing the 1ncome:s of sB.lnrieil Bnd ~elf-employed physicls.ns, 
Bec FaIt cl"mayel"', p. 83 Dnd !..t~~.!.£ians ~_~Ea!:r~1ng~_~!2d 
Exnenses pp. 52-55. -----,--~, 
TABLE I 
RATIO OF UNACCEPTED KAISER APPLICANTS TO STAFF OPENINGS, 1943-6g 
y 
-­
e a r 
Before 
.J:.~ !2.62 126i !264- 12§5. 126~ ;1;.2,61 ,!26g 
Ratio or Unaccepted
Applicants to 

§tatL9E.eni!28:s': ___ 0 9 14- 9 17 34- 20 35 

8The few Job inquiries from physioians whose specialt1es are not represented

in Kaiser are not included in these data. 

Source: The data on whic.h - thrstable Is based are :round in Ap-oendlx A~ue ­
-source of these data is Kaiser's records of personnel advertisements t1962-6g) and 
discontinued job inquirles.(1959-6S). 
-------------------.-----------------------------­
o 
~ 
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openings tor the period 1943-6g. In spito of some incon­

sistencies, the general trend is toward more applicants who 

do not accept positions in Kaiser. (Perhaps they ta~e Jobs 

elBe~'ihere or perhaps Kaiser does not want to hire them.) 

Aooording to the table, it appears that prior to 
1962, Kaiser had no Job applicants who dld not accept posi­
·tions 1n Kaiser and also no advertised statf op~nings, thus 
giving the ratio of zero found in the table. Hot'lcver, th1s 
statement must be qunlit"led for the follovling reason. Be­
tween 1959 and 1962 Kaiser did receive a fevi discontinued 
Job inquiries although it did not plaoe any advertlsnmenta 
regarding atatf openings in the; Journals. Strictly speak­
ing, the ratio for this peI'iod 1s infinity rather than zero 
(aince the denominator 1s zero). 
Oonsidering the data on wldoh this ratio 1s based, 
one realizes that the ratio laqke meaning as an 1ndicator 
for the status of Kaiser. However, on the assumption that 
the datn from 1959 to 1962 oanbe interpreted in the same 
way as the data prior to 1959, then the ratio baaed on tho 
data p~lor to 1959 is a meaningful indioator for the statue 
of KaiM)r during the \'lhole per10d prior to 1962. 
The ratiO of unaooepted job applioants to job open­

ings before 1959 1s zero. On the basis of oonversations 

with Kaiser personnel responsible for reoord-keeping, it 

seems safe to assume that before 1959 .1ob inquiries 't>lere 

reoeived only ft'om those physic1ans \-!ho lEtter aocopted 

I 

II 

II I 

'I' I 
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I I 
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positions 1n Kaiser, whereas none were received from physi­
cians \';ho eventually accepted Jobs elseuhere. On the sarna 
baaie, it can be assumed that no personnel advertisements 
Welle made prior to 1962. Thus, we can conclude that prior 
to 1959 there were no app11cants for stafr positions other 
than those who eventually became active staff and also no 
staff' position openings. The ratio of unaccepted job appli­
cants to job openings before 1959 1s then zero. Therefore, 
although the ratio of discontinued Job inquiries to Job open­
ings for 1959-62 1s actually infinity, it seems appropriate 
to express the ratio covering all the years prior to 1962 as 
zero. 
Having found that the ratios of unaccepted applioants 
to staff openings have been 1ncreasing over time, we have 
conoluded that the status of Kaiser haa also been inoreas­
ing. However, there are two other possible interpretations 
of these data whioh must be discussed. 
According to the first interpretation, one could argue 
that the trend in job inquiries refleots ohnngcs in Kaiser's 
methods of recrUitment. It appears likely that in the past 
Kaiser may have exchanged letters only \'lith physioians \,,rho 
were kno:·m to be seriously interested. in a posltlon in 
kaiser and to whom Kaiser was Willing to offer Jobs. Fur­
thermore, in the past interested phYSicians iV'ere probably 
discovered differently. 'l'hey may have been friends or 
aoquainta.nces of Kaleel' physicians or frlendn of friends, 
etc. This 1'IOulcl provide an opportunity for an lnltlal 
informal expression of interest in recruitment and employ­
ment. Written communication may have begun later and served 
only to formalize informally mqde decisions. 
However, in 1962 Kaiser begPJl to place personnel ac'!ver­
t1sementa 1n the medical journals. Physicians unfamiliar 
with Kaiaer or its staff were thus given the opportunity to 
write and find out job details. This chango in recruitment 
methods ",ould then explain why Kaiser began to l~ecei ve job 
inquiries only recently. 
Although this interpretation of the d~ta on job inqui­
ries seems plausible, it is not supported by the data. It 
cannot account for the inquiries receivea bet'tleen 1959 and 
1962 before any ads were run in the journals. 
A seoond possiblo interpretation of the data on job 
inquiries is thnt in the profession as a whole, increasing 
numbers of physicians have been taking salaried positions .11 
Accordingly, the morefroquent job 1nquiries into pOSitions 
in Kaiser refl~)ct the widespread grm'ling demand for posi­
tions not only in prepaid group health plans but also in 
government, industry, public health,eto. 
Unfortunately, we lack dnta relevant to this interpre­
tation and therefore osnnot reject it. As a result, the data 
on job inquiries do not provide an unamb1guous ind1cator for 
llRayack, p. 46. 
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the increasing atatus of Kaiser. A comparison of the salary 
of tho Kaiser physician to the income of the private practi­
tioner will. At the very least, such a comparison should 
make it possible to decide \'lhether or not to reJ ect the 
interpretation which stressos changes in the medical profes­
aion aa a whole. 
Data on Second Indicator for Kaiser's Status. The
-----------"----------------"----­
second indicstor for the status of Kaiser is a comparison of 
the rate of increase in the starting salaries of Kaiser spo­
clalista to the rate of lncrense in the incomes of self­
employed physicians under sixty-f1ve. As stated earlier, 1t 
involves a comparison of the incomes of Kaieer physicians to 
those of private praotitioners in order to assure that the 
indicator reflects the relative status of Kaiser. However, 
comparable data on beginning speoialists in private practice 
could not be seourod . Thus, a pot ential source of error ''ISS 
intr01uced into this indioator. 
Additional sources of error were introduced by various 
difficulties encountered in the Kaiser sta.rting sa.lary data. 
The first shortooming of these data is that it 113 not olear 
whether they are mean or median data, or neither. Aooording 
to various Kaiser· officials, the salaries 0:[ phYSicians in 
Kaiser vary only by specialty and by Amerioan Speoialty 
Board Oertification. The salary dat~ provided by the Finan­
oial Division are consistent \-lith this polnt ofvlew. Hm1­
ever, during thG ds.ta-gatllex'lng stage of research, a variety 
of evidence was revealed indicating that the salaries of 
Kaiser physicians aleo vary according to other factors, e.g., 
a physician's prior experience practicing. Therefore, it is 
necessary to question the representativeness of these data. 
Fortunately, it was possible to cross-check the offi­
cial data with data from another source, the records of per­
sonnel advertisements plaoed in medical journals. Although 
the data from the ads cover only the period from 1962 to 
1969, a number of comparisons are possible. (See Appendix E, 
Part II for more details.) There appears to be a c10so cor­
respondence bet\,1oen the two eet a of' data in the CEl.se of four 
speoialties--internal medicine, pediatrics, radiology, and 
orthopedio surgery. In the case of obstetrics-gynecology, 
the ofticis.1 data gl ve lower rntes than the data from the ads, 
whereas in the case of general surgery, the opposite is true. 
Data tor four other speCialties were too scant for comparison. 
The high degree of oorrespondence between these two 
sets of data facl'litateE their interpretation. It seems 
reasonable to a.ssume that the data in the ads approximate the 
median salaries Qf the various Kaiser specialists: most phy­
sicians in a given speCialty are probably hired at the adver­
tised rate for that specis.lty, although some may be given 
more and othere leas. It also seems reasonable to equate 
the official data ",ith that in the ads bee.nuse of the high 
degree of agl"ecment found betw'een them. Therefore, we can 
interpret the mora comprehensive off1oial date, ao representing 
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the median salaries of the vnrlous Kaiser specialists. 
The second eho:rtcGmlng of' the starting salary data. on 
Kaiser physioianG is that its oompleteness varlea betueen 
speoialties. Data for specialties uhlch 11eI'e not repre­
sented at Kaiser until recently, such as urology, psychiatry, 
and otolaryngology, do not begin until the 1960's. In con­
trast, data on pediatrics as well as three other speoialties 
begin in the late 1940 l s. 
Although this dlfficulty might have been dealt 1'li th by 
estimating the size of the missing salaries, this procedure 
was not follolTsd since the ratios between the salaries at 
different speoialties and bet'Neen the sa.laries of different 
yeare fluotuated too wildly over time. As a result, it waR 
not possible to compute the average starting salary of the 
Kaiser physician over time from the date. on the stro"ting sal­
aries of the var10us Kaiserspecia11sts. 
In -plaoe of data on the average starting salary of the 
Kaiser physician, fairly comprehens1ve data on the starting 
salaries of' one group of' specialists were used. The spe­
cialists in this group have 1dontical salary schedules. They 
inolude internists, surgeons, obstetrioian-gynecologists, and 
pediatricians (Il>1-GS-OBG-PD) t and they reoc1va the 1m-lest 
salaries of all Kaiser physicians. 
This pl~ocedurc of using data on the salaries of one 
group of Kaisel" specialists ra.ther than data on the salaries 
of all specialists may seem highly unsatisfactory. However, 
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taking into consideration the distribution of Kaiser physi­
cicans by specialty, one sees that it may be ,V'orkablo (Table 
II). Since seventy-one per oent 01' the physicians at Kaisel­
in 1969 and an even high(~r percentage in earlier years were 
either internists, surgeons, obstetrician-gynecologists, or 
pediatricians, the data on their salaries are representative 
of the salaries ot most Kaiser physioians. In fact J if we 
had data on the median starting salary of the Kaiser phys~.~· 
cian, it would probably be the salary of a. physician coming 
from this group of specialists. 
Therefore, in spite of the shortcomings in the salary 
data whioh were Just outlined, the data on the starting sal­
aries of the IM-GS-OBG-PD group of Kaiser specialists \'lill 
be interpreted to be representative of the median starting 
salary of the Kaiser physician. However, the possibility 
must be noted that this assumption ma.y lead to errors in the­
use of the salary data as an indicator for changes in the 
status of Kaiser. 
TabJ.e III compares the rates of increase in incomo pel" 
year for self-employed physicians under sixty-five nnd for 
the IM-GS-IBG-PD group of Kainer specialists (thooe most 
represen'l;;ative of all Ka.1~er physicians). Around 'the begin­
ning of the 1950's,we find that the incomes of private 
practitioners were rising much more rapidly than the sal­
a.ries of Kaiser physicians. Over the next ten years Kaiser 
physicians beg.~m to catch up \"ith the private practit10ners 
TABLE II 
DISTRIBUTION OF KAIBER PHYSICIANS BY SPECIALTY, 1969 
(Per cent) 
1M, GS R OTO, A, NS'd OB~PDa ORab OPR 0 TOTAL
--
~~!:-
---­
Kaiser 

?!:lB1oi8~ 7176 7% 6% 16% 100% 

N _ 96
-

8Internal modicine, general surgery, obetetrlos­
gynecology, pediatrics. 
bRadiology. orthopedio Burgery. 
°Oto1aryngology, ophthalmology. 
dAnestheslo10gy t neurological surgery t ul'ology t gen­
eral practice. 
-----~, -------------" - - ---------­
but then slipped behind again. Ho\~ever, we find that by the 
1960's the rate of increase 1n Kaiser salaries exceeds the 
rate of inorease 1n private practitioners' incomes. In 
other warde, it appears that over the twenty-year period 
from 1945 to 1965, Kaiser ocoupied a 101'1', then middle, and 
finally high status posit~.on .12 
12S1nce data on the beginning incomes of self-employed
speCialists l'lere not used 1,n this study, our conclusion that 
the statue of Kaiser has increased rema.1ns tentative. Never­
theless, consider how our conclusions would be modified 1t 
we were using data on self-employed specialists instead of 
data on all self-employed physicians. Whereas from 1951 to 
1959 the incomes of specialists in pr1vate practice 1ncreased 
at the rate of 5.6 per cent per year (soe n. 9), from 19~'9 
to 1959 the starting salaries of Kaiser specialiats increased 
at a rate of only 3.0 per cont per year. Similarly, from 
TABLE III 
LONGITUDINAL COMPARISON OF RATES OF INOREASE PER YEAR IN INOOMES OF 

ONE GROUP OF KAISER SPEOIALISTS (IM-GS-OEG-PD) AND OF 

SELF-EMPLOYED PHYSICIANS UNDER 6Sa 

(Per cent) 
Rate ot Increase per
Year in Salaries or 
Rate ot Inorease per
Year in Inoomes of Se1f­
Period Kaiser S:Qecia11sta Pe!:!od EmE.+..Q.led Ph-y_s1c1_ana 
1949-53 5.7% 1947-S1 12.g% 
1953-56 3·7 1951-55 S·5 
1956-59 3·3 1955-59 9 ~.... 
1959-62 7.7 1959-62 3.3 
"1962-65 10.3 1962-64 g.5 
~he data on wh10h this table 1s based are :round 1n Table XXXI, Append1x B. 
g 
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Having determined the d3.rcctlon of change in the statue 
of, Kaiser over the years) \lJe must nm1 decide lfnich years 
mark the boundaries betl-Toen Kaiser IS 101.'1, middle, and h1r.h 
status periods. Although the data on the relative rate ot 
i~orease in Kaiser salaries seemed sufficiently accurate for 
the purpose ot determining "mether or not the status ot 
Kaiser had inoreased in the long run, it does not tollow 
that they would aid in det~rmining exactly when sh1fts in 
the general trend oocurred. Therefore, the timing of these 
shifts will be determined not only on the baSis of the data 
on relative increases presented above but also on the basis 
ot the data showing absolute increases in the starting sal­
aries of Kaiser specialists over time (Figure 1). 
Figure 1 is a graph of the starting salaries of three 
groups of Kaiser specialists, the IM-~S-OBG-PD group, a 
group which includes radiologists and orthapedic surgeons 
(R-ORS), and the otolal~yngologlsts (OTO). It includes all 
specialties for whioh there are enough data to reveal 
---_._-----------------,-­
1962 to 1963 the inoomes of the former increased 5.5 per 
cent per year, While botween 1961 and 1963 the salaries of 
the latter inoreased 4.0 per cent per year.
The conclusion that the status of Kaiser has inc~cased 
is still supported though leas dramatically so: although the 
rate of inorease in Kaiser salaries never exoeeds that of the 
incomes of self-employed opoolaliats, Kaiser appears to be 
slol'lly closing the gap beti'leen its salaries and those ot 
speCialists in private practice. Unfortunately, we ca.nnot 
make similar comparisons bett/cen the incomes of beginning
physiCians in private practioe and in Kaiser. Thus, there is 
no way to oetel'mine the dir'sct1on of any error ..ihleh may
reside in our findings ao a result of this 1,aek. of data on 
the incomes of beginning physioians. 
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Starting
salaryB. 
$30,000 
2S,OOO -~~---~ ---------~----------,-
26,000 
24,000 
22,000 
20,000 
19,OOO 
16,000 
14,000 
12,000 
10,000 
62 64 66 6S 
! 
70 
----..--...-~----------------------------
Fi~re 1. Graph of starting salaries of three 

groups of Kaiser specia.lists over time. 

aThese starting salaries are reported at the board­

certified levelj subtract $1,200 for nonbOl~rd level. 

Source: Data on the IM-GS-OBG-PD aoo OTO groups of 

Kaiser specialists come from an official starting salary 

schedule. The salaries of the R-ORS ~~oU? represent a com­

bina.tion of data fl'Om. the official startirng salal'Y -schedule 

and from records of personnel advertisements (For details, 

I 

I 

see Appendix B, Part II). 
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changing trends. One major shift in the trend tot'lard higher 
salaries is revealed here. It occurs l)etneon 1963 and 1964 
and marks the beginning of a period of sharply increasing 
salaries. Similarly, the data on the relative rates of 
increase 1n these salarios show one marked change 1n the 
trend toward hlgher salaries (Table III). HOtf'ever, it seems 
to occur batt-Icen 1959 and 1960, rather than between 1963 and 
1961~. In both sets of data $. minor shift appears to occur 
between 1953 and 1954. 
By relying more heavily on the absolute salary data 
. than on the relet!va sals.,ry data, the follo-uing breakdoHn 
•for the status of Ka1ser was defined: The period when the 
status of Kaisel"' was low runs froOl 1943 through 1953 and 
thus includes a number of years (1943-47) for which no sal­
ary. data were available. It is assumed that the variations 
in salaries during these early years are consistent with the 
data available in the later years of this time period. The 
second period, t'lhen Kaiser occupied a middle status posi­
tion, covers the years from 1954 through 1963. Finally, the 
period of Kaiser's high status runs from 1964 through 1969. 
Although this breakdovm may not be the only ono which 
can be derived fI'om the salary data, Table IV indicates that 
it 1s a valid one. This table presents a rough comparison 
of the rate of increase in income per year of Kaiser spe­
cialists and nll private practitioners for the three time 
periods defined above. Tha data reveal that dur1ng the 
TABLE IV 
>' 
OOMFARISON OF RATES OF INCREASE FER YEAR 'IN INCOMES OF ONE GROUP 
OF KAISER SPECIALISTS (IM-GS-OBG-PD) AND OF SELF-m~PLOYED 
PHYSICIANS UNDER 65 DURING SELECTED PERIODS OF TIMEs 
(Per oent) 
Period 
~
Rate of Increase 
per Year 1n Sa1ar1es of 
Ka1ser S~e~1a11sts Per10d 
Rate Of Inorease per
Year 1n Inoomes of Self­
__ Em~oled Physic1ans 
1949-53 5.7% 1947-51 12.S% 
1953-62 5.6 . 1951-62 7·2 
1962-65 10.3 1962-64 g.5 
aThe data on wh10h th1s table 1s based are found 1n Table XXXI, Appendix B. 
----~----..--..--~....--~----~., 
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first period Kaiser salaries were 1ncreasing at a much 
slot'ler rate than the incomea of private practitioners. In 
1 

the second per10d the gap between the rates decreased 
1 

markedly. Finally, in thel th1rd period Kai-ser salaries were 
1 

1ncreasing more rapidly thEm tbe incomes of p:;:'! vate practl-
I 

tioners. We conclude thatl the status of Kaiser has 1n­
1

creased from low to high dux'i ng the following three periods: 
1 

1943-53, 1954-63, and ~96~-69. 

I 

We have now examined all the data on the second lndi­
1 

cator for th~ status of K~iser. As 1n the caoe of the first 
\ 
indicator, we found ~hat ~he status of Kaiser has increased 
over _time. However, although e(;u"'11er \'ie were unable to 
, , 
1

rejeot the alternative interpretation that the data merely 
I 

reflected trends in the m~d1ca1 profession as a whole, we 
1 

can now do 60 on the basis of the data on 
, I 

of increase 1n Kaiser aalaries. 
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the relative rates 
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CHAPTER III 
FINDINGS: STATUS OF DOCTORS ENTF~ING KAISER 
This chapter contains the findings for the first 
hypothesis of this study. Since the data, which include a 
variety of. indicators and oontrols, 1n most cases do not 
support the hypothesis, the hypothesis must be rejeoted. 
HOl-leVer, beoause of l'leaknesses in the data and design ot 
this study, all conclusions are tentative. 
The first hypotheeis of this study states that: 
As the status (rank) of Ka1 ear lncl"eas6s, the statuu 
(rank) of phySicians entering Kaiser ,"111 inor'easo. 
It was further refined by dlstinguishing bet\'/een tl'10 com­
ponents of the dependent variable, the aohieved and asoribed 
aspects of status, ana r.estate~ as follows: 
As the status of Kaiser increases, a) the achieved 
status of physioians entering Kalser will inorease 
B.nd b) the ascribed etatu8 of these physicians wl1l 
increase. 
-The disoussion of this ohapter will begln wlth the f1ndlngs 
lvh10h relate to the achleved status of phystclans enter~.ng 
Kalser. Luter i-Ie 1'1111 disouss the findlngs relating to 
their aso~1bed status. 
I. 	 DATA ON HYPOTHESI S ONE \ffiEN ACHIEVED 
STATUS IS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Throe 	different indicators tor physicians' achieved 
status were Ilsed: prestige of medical school, prestige of 
references, and prestige of hosp1tals of 1nternship a.nti 
residency. \'/e w111 st!u·t with the data involvlng the first 
. indicator. These findtngs are of particular importance 
inasmuch as data for the Whole universe of Kaiser physiCians 
were available only for this indicator of achieved status 
but not for the other two. 
First 	Ind1oator for' Achieved Status 
rlnd~ngs. Oontrary to our hypothesized expectations, 
the data (Table V) show that as the stHtus of Kaiser has 
increased, the percentage of high status physicians ent0~­
ing Ka1 ser has decreased and the percentage of 1mi' sta.tus 
phys1cians has inoreased. In other words, 8.S the sta.tue of 
Kalser increased, the status of physicians (mtering K~d.oer 
decreased. Although a direot relationship lias hypoths8ized 
betw'oen these two variD.bles. the findings show that they sre 
inversely related to some degree. Gamma, D. measure of the 
strength of associat10n betueen tl'lO variables, 1s -0.163, 
which ind1cat as ths.t there l B a relv.tiveJ.y \'-leM nugst iva 
association betwoen the status of Kaiser and the status ot 
physicians who have entJred Ke.1s6r over time. 
Extraneous Unoont ....·011ed Variables. Interpretation of
----_..-._._--_...-...... -----....... --,...... _----_.,_.-----_. 

those 	findingd ~.s not clsti:.l'-·cu.t. ~Phey Appear to be 
PP.ESTIGE OF PHYSICIANS' 
TABLE V 
MEDICAL SCHOOL BY TIilLE OF ENTRY IN'ro KAISER 
(Per oent) 
Period and Status of Kalser 
Medical Sohoo1
-­
Loti 
High 
1943-53 
(LO~T Status) 
39% 
61 
1954-63 (Mld£le Status) 
46% 
54 
1964-69 
i.H1~!atus) 
52% 
4g 
Total 
Number 
100 
2g 
100 
Ll-1 
100 
7'9 
gamma = -0.163 
\J'I 
-.J 
contrary to theory. HOlveVC1', this conclusion can be stated 
only tentatively since the design of this study includes 
nei ther a control gl'OUp of prlvate practi tioners nor 8. con­
trol on changes in the composition of the medical profession 
as a tlhole. Thus, it ls possible that the f1ndlng of a 
decrease in the status of KaiEer physioians might be the 
effect of changes ln the oomposition of the medlcal profes­
sion as a whole. 
For lnstance, over the past t\,lenty-flve years the per­
centage of physicians grad.uating from lot'l prestlge medical 
schools may have lncreased. relAtlve to the percentage corning 
from high prestige schools. In other l'lOrdB, the distr'ibu­
tion of medlcal studonto among high and loY status schools 
may have changed. If such a change has occurred, then it 
would be likely that prepaid group practltloners as well as 
prlvato praotltioners n011 more frequently come from 10"-' 
status schools than they dld in the past. 
Another klnd of change in the composltlon of the medi­
cal professlon 'might also have influenced. the findings of 
this study. Reyack argues that relati va to the demand for­
mcdice.l serVices, the size of the medical profession has 
been decreasing. l Aocording to him, the rcsulti~g shortage 
of pl'.yslciana has led, for instance, to lncreases ln the 
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recruitment of interns, residents, and graduates of foreign 
medical schools by hospitals. 'l'h1s shortage could conoeiv­
ably lead as well to changes in the distribution of high and 
lmi status graduates among the various sectors of the medi­
cal profess1on. For example, perhaps the percentage of 
phys1cians from low status medical schools entering both 
pr1vate and prepa1d group pract1ce has 1ncreased relative to 
the percentage go1ng 1nto research or teaching. 
How'ever, if we could eliminate the effect of this vari­
able (the composit1on of the medical profession) from our 
find1ngs, we might find that the status of physicians enter­
ing Ka1ser has 1ncreased. Suppose we could eliminate tho 
effect of changes in the distribution of medical students 
among high and 10Tll status sohools. We then might find that 
the ratio_of low status graduates entering Kaiser to the 
total numbor of low status graduates had decreased over time. 
We would conclude that the status of Ka1ser recruits had 
increased 'over time. 
Similarly, suppose we could el~mlnate the effect of 
changes in the distr1bution of high and low status graduates 
among various seotol's of the medioal profession. ~le might 
find that the proportion of low status graduates among all 
phys1cians entering Kaiser had inoreased less rapidly than 
the proportion of low status graduates among all physicians 
entering private specialty practioe. Again we would conclude 
that the status of Kaiser recruits had inoreased over t1me. 
II 
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In addition to the composition of the medical profes­
sion, there is one other extraneous uncontrolled variable 
which may have an effeot on the findings of this study, 
Inamely, changes in the reoruitment policy of Kaiser. A num­
ber of such ohanges appear to have occurred over the years: 
1) an incrasse in the range of specialt1es represented by 
Kaiser physicians, 2) expansion of existing speCialty 
groups, 3) variations in the size of the preccptorship (resi­
dency) program, and 4) the first employment of general prac­
titionel"s (GP' 6) in the emergency room of Bess Kaiser Hos­
pital in 1969. 
Each of these ~~anges could conceivably have contrib­
uted to the increasing percentage of low status physicians 
entering Kaiser. 2 In fact, the last chango appeers to havo 
had such an effect: five of the seven GP's (seventy-one 
per cent) graduated from low prestige medictd schools, 
whereas les8 than forty-eight per cent of the specia11sts 
entering Kaiser from 1964 to 1969 graduated from such schools. 
In other words, the propo!'tion of low status GF's enter1.ng 
Kaiser is much higher than the proportion of low status 
2For instance, the '1ncref.l:3e in the range of specialty 
services could have led to an inorease in recruitment from 
Kaiser's courtesy and consulting staffs. The physicians who 
had formerly provided spocie.lty oare :for Kaiser patients on a 
part-time baeis 't'lOuld ha~je been given full-t1me, active staff 
positions. As s result, the percentage of phYSicians enter­
ing Kaiser who were already a part of the Portland medical 
community "lOule} probably have 1ncreased. This could. conceiv­
ably have led to an increase in the reoruitment of physicians
from the Universtty of Orogon, a 101'1 prestige sohool. 
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specia11sts. 
Furthermore, four of the seven GP's graduated from the 
Unlverslty of Oregon Medical School, a school with low pres­
t1ge. Th1s flgure becomes more s1gniflcant when we reallze 
that all exoept one of the GP's (the exoeptlon was a former 
preoeptee at Kaiser) had some connection with the Universlty 
of Oregon as a medlcal student, lntern, or resldent. To the 
extent that the Unlversity serves as the lilain source of GP 
recrultment, lt ls likely that the status of GP's recrulted 
will be affected. To the extent that taklng the eme~gency 
room positlon 10 compatlble with concur-rent meGlcal tralnlng, 
the near-by Unlversi ty of Ol"egon Medlcal School ls likely to 
continue to be a source for at leD-st some of the recruits for 
the positlon of emergency room GP. 
As the dl saussion of 'GP reerul tment abO~'6, cha.nges in 
recruitment policy may lead to changes ln the status of phy­
slcians entering Kalser. If we could control thls factor, we 
mlght find that tho hypotheslzed relation be:tueen the status 
of Kaiser and the status of' lts recruits llOOld emerge. For 
lnstance, if we made a long! tudlnal comparls,on of the status 
only of those recruits from special ties lfhleh he.va been 
represented at Kaiser slnce 1943, we might tind that the 
status ot.-these physioians had inoreased over tlme. Unfor­
tunately, without a more comprehensive indlcator for changes 
ln recruitment policy, there ls no way to place a oontrol on 
this variable. 
I 
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Since we have no controls for these two seemingly 
important extraneous VB.l'lables, thi 8 study ca.n provide only 
a tentative interpretation of the finding that as the status 
of K~iser has 1ncreased, the status of physicians entering 
Kaiser has decreased. However, other important extraneous 
variables can be controlled. 
Oontrols. Four controls were placed on hypothesis one. 
Following a brief introduction of these controls and our 
expeotations concerning them, the relevant data will be 
presented. 
The first control was in-etate/out-of-state location 
of med1cal Bchool. Since there 1s only one ~~-approved 
medical school 1.n Oregon, in-state schools refer exclusively 
to the University of Orl3gon Medical School in Portla.nd. Out­
of-state schools refer to all other schools of Kaiser re­
cru1ts. This control, unlike the others, was not introduced 
on theoret1cal grounds; 1t \'1as not part of the original 
research design. Rather, 1t 118S introduced later dur1ng the 
analysis of the data on the hunch that it m1ght be inter­
related with the status of physiCians entering Kaiser. 
The second and third controla introduced into the rela.­
tionship between the status of Kaiser and the achieved status 
of ita recrulto were nationality and length of previous prac­
tice, two types of ascribed atatus. The indicator for 
nationality WaS the foreign versus domestic location of phy­
sicians' medica.l schools. A U. 8. school ind1cates high 
i:1 
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ascribed status, and a foreign school lnd1cctes low ascribed 
status. Similal"ly, in the case of. length of previous pra.c­
tice, one or more years' experience in practice is presumed 
to indicate a higher ascribed status than no experience in 
practice. 
Achievement and ascription represent two criteria 
according to l'lhich the extrinsic re'VTaI'ds defining an individ­
ual's status, or rank, are distributed. In other words, 
status, or rank, is made up of two interdependent factors, 
achieved and ascribed status. Since achieved and ascribed 
status are interdependent, controls on ascr1bed status were 
introduoed into tho relationship bet't;lcen the status of Kaiser 
and the achieved status of its recruits. 
Active/inactive staff status was the fourth and final 
oontrol plaoed on hypotllesis one. Active/inactive staff 
status, i. e., whether a physician remains in Kaiser or leavec 
to go elseWhere, represents the same kind of mobilIty factor 
as a physician's entranoe into Kaiser. Accordingly, one 
would expeot them to bo interdependent in some way. F'urther­
more, as suggested earlier,; one would expect that the intro­
duotion of this control would refine the original relation­
ship bctl'/een the status of Kai sel' and the status of it 6 
recruits by revealing its limiting oonditions, such that the 
original hypothesis would hold true only among aotive or 
only among inactive staff. 
3~upr~, p. 26. 
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The 1ntroduction of the first control into the rela­
" 
I 
" 
tionship between the status of Kaiser nnd the status of itD il 
recruits resulted in the f1nd,ings presented in Tables VI and 
VII. These findings Dhow that the original inverse relation­
ship found between the status of Kaiser and the status of its 
recruits remains a~ong both in-atste and out-of-state gradu­
ates. Table VI reveals that among physicians from out-of­
state medical schools, the original relationship remains 
although it is mu~~ weaker. It involves a shift of only 
four percentage points as compared to a shift of thirteen in 
the original correlation. From Table VII lt is evident that 
recrultment from the 10\-1 status Unlversity of Oregon ha.s 
steadlly lncreased over the years. In sum, we find that tho 
percentage of lm'i status phYSiCian£! frc1m both In-sto.te and 
out-of-state medlcal schools has increased over time. 
In order to clarify the nature of the interrelationship 
among the status of Kaiser, the status of its recrUits, and 
the location of their medical schools, one can ask whether 
the control factor serves to ref1ne, expand, or explain the 
original correlation. These alternative. lnterrelationships 
which independent, dependent, and control vnriables may take 
!t­are defined by Zeiael as follows: Refinement involves tho 
1ntroduction of a. third factor into a correlation auch that 
-- ----
TABLE VI 
PRESTIGE OF MEDICAL SCHOOL BY TIME OF ENTRY INTO KAISER AMONG 
PHYSICIANS FROM OUT-OF-STATE MEDICAL SCHOOLS 
(Per cent) 
Per10d and.. Status of Ka1ser 
Pr~stlge ot 
Mcd1cal.SchQ.o1 1943-53 (Lo,"r Status)
-
1954-63 (M1ddle Ststull 1964-69 (Hi~Status) 
Low 37% 39% 41% 
H1gh 63 61 59 
Total 100 100 100 

Number 27 36 64 

------...---------------...------------------------~--------------.----------------------------~...-----------------' 
TABLE VII 
PHYSICIANS FROM IN-STATE MEDICAL SCHOOLS BY TIME OF ENTRY INTO KAISER 
Period and Status of Ka1ser 
1943-53 1954-63 1964-69 (Low Status) {M1ddle~tatus) (H~h Status) 
Physic1ans from 
In-State 
}ljed1csl Sohools 1 5 15 0'\ 
\.11 
----------- ------------.--------------- -----------------------------------------­
, ~ _,~-------.'7~--~------ ______~ ____ ~~~--
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the or1ginal relationship is changed under the ne'., condi­
tions of the third factor. 5 ExpEtnsion involves the intl"o­
duct ion of third factors which "have an independent influ­
ence upon the factor considered as the 'effect' in the 
original correlation ll but which do not mod1fy the original 
6
relationship. Explanation involves the introduction of 
,third factors llhich are not only correlat ad with the effect 
in the original relation but "also l"elat ed to the factor 
considered as causal in the ol~iginal correlation. 8 7 In nci­
thel" refinement nor expansion is the third factor related to 
the causal factor in the original relation. 
Applying these distinctions to the data in Tables VI 
and VII, we find that introducing the oontrol on location of 
medical sohool does not refine the original correlation: the 
original inverse relationship bet'i>lCen the status of Kaiser 
and the statue of its recruits remains among both out-of­
state and in-state reoruits. 
Table VIII presento data on the relationship bet'''een 
the independent and control variables, the status of Kaiser 
and the locat1on of reol'uito' medical schools. The tl'lO vari­
abIes are only slightly correlated: a shift of only fifteen 
percentage pOints is involved. Since the correlation is BO 
small, the third factor does not explain the original 
5Ibld., pp. 199, 190.
-- ... 
7Ibid., pp. 190-191. 
I I 
I 
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TABLE VIII 

LOCATION OF PHYSICIANS' MEDICAL SCHOOL BY TIME OF ENTRY INTO KAISER 

(Per cent) 

Per10d and Status of K~~ 
Location of 
Medical School
-
19q.3-53
iLow Status) 
1954-63l.Mldd1e StatusL 1964-69 (H1gh Status) 
Out -of-stat e 96% gg% gl% 
In-state 4 12 19 
Total 100 100 100 

Number p-g 41 79 

0"\ 
-.J 
g
relationship. Instead" med1cal school 10catiol1 expa.nds the 
or1ginal hypothesis, exerting an independent influence on 
the dependent variable, the status of phys10ians enter1ng 
Kaiser. 
Although this control on location of a phys1cian 
' 
s 
medical sohool t'1as not introduoed on theoretical grounds, 1 t 
proved to be important within the context of the present 
study. Should this variable then be incorporated into 
future hypotheses about the mobility of phYSicians into pre­
paid group practice~ Should it be used 1n tests of suoh 
hypotheses? It should not be, 1f its importance in the 
present study represents the exception rather than the rule. 
The medical school situation of Oregon is atypical, there 
being only one AMA-npproved medical school, which ha.s low 
status. Therefore, one \'10uld expect the significance of 
this control to be l1mited to the situation of the Kaiser 
Foundation Health Plan 1n Oregon. 
Nationality, one type of ascribed status, was the sec­
ond control introduced 1nto the relationship between the 
gWhether a control variable serves to expand or 
explain a l'elatlonship depends on themagnitude of the cor­
relation bet't'Tcen independent and oontrol variables. The 
ideal case of explanation ,.,0uld be characterized by a per­
fect corralation betimen these variables; the ideal oase of 
expanston "lOuld involve 8.. zero correlation. Thus, the weak 
oorrelation found between the status of Kaiser and the 1n­
state/out-of-state location of recruits l medical schools 
indicates that, atr! ctly apea1r.ing, the contI'ol variable nei­
ther cAple.ins nor expands the origins.l correlation. HOliever, 
recognizing that the distinction betl1een expansion and 
explanation 1s releti va, cne l170uld describe the effect of 
this control varia,ble a3 expansion rather than explanation. 
I,j 
,I 
I 
II 
status of Kalser and the achleved status of physiclans 
entering Kaiaer. Table IX ahows that among recrults from 
U. S. medical sohools (l.e., recrulta with hlgh ascribed 
status), the orlglnal lnverse relatlons...ltip between the. 
status of Kalser and 'the achieved status of its recruits 
remalns, although it 1s sllghtly weaker. In contrast, the 
relationship does not appear to hold a~ong recruits from 
foreign schools (who have low ascrlbed status). The aohleved 
status of the latter physlo1ans seems first to lncrease and 
then to decrease. 
However. because of the small number of cases of 
fore1gn graduates (N = 24), the percentage figures may be 
mlsleading. If we dlsregard the flgures for the flrst time 
period Which are based on only two cases, then we find that 
the trend bett-leen the second and th1rd periods is consi st ent ~~ 
with the orig1nal correlation: the achieved status of for­
elgn physicians entering Kaiser has decreased. 
Another way to look at the data on foreign graduates 
1s to use the total number of foreign graduates as the per­
centa,ge be,se rather than the total entering Kalser in any 
given tir:,e period. This serves to elim1nnte the effects of 
variations ln the total number of IO~1 and high achieved 
status recru~.ts to enter Ku1sa!' in any given time period. 
When this method of percentaging i8 uEled (Table X), we see 
tbat the poroentage of fore1gn graduates l'lith low achieved 
status entering Kaiser has iner'ee.eed mOl'C rfJ.pldly than the 
Ii I 
I, I 
II, I 
:,'11 I 
I I 
I 
I I 
: I 
I I 
II 
, I 
I! 
I 
" 
I 
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TABLE IX 
PRESTIGE OF PHYSICIANS' MEDICAL SCHOOL BY TIME OF ENTRY 
INTO KAISER AND ~ATIONALITY 
(Per cent) 
1943-53 1954-63 1964-69 
!.Low Status) (Mldd:l;e Ste.tusl (High Status) 
Prestige or 

Medical School Fore~@. U.S. Fo!:eim U.S. For~ U.S. 

, Low 100.0% 34.6% 50.0~ 45.7f., 75.0% 46.0% 

High 0.0 65.4- 50.0 54.3 25.0 5!t.O 

, 
Total 100 100 100 100 lOa 100 
Number 2 26 6 35 16 63 
...-----.~-----
-.J 
o 
TABLE X 
PRESTIGE OF MED!CAL SCHOOL BY TIME OF ENTRY INTO KAISER 
AMONG,PHYSICI;~S OF FOREIGN BIRTH ' 
(Per oent) 
Perl?d and Sta~~of_Kaiser 
Prest1ge of' 
lw1ed1cal Sohool 
1943-53 
tLOl( St~!us) 
1954-63 (Middle Status) 1964-69 (High Statu& 
Low 4% 13% 52% 
H1gh o 13 19 
N =23 
-----------------------------­ --------------------------------------------­
...... 
t-t 
....,="':"",~_ 1 ..,-..... / 
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percentage of foreign graduates with high achieved status. 
It the small number' of foreign gra<1uates is taken into 
account, it seems reasonable to conclude that among fore1gn 
graduates, as among U. S. graduates (i.e., graduates with 
both high and 101'1 ascribed status), the ach1eved statu.a of 
physicians entering Kaiser has docreased, l"/hile the status 
of Kaiser has increased. Thus, since the orig1.nal correla­
tion continues to hold among both U. S. and foreign medical 
school graduates, it is not refined by the introduction of 
thls control on ascribed status. 
Table XI shot'1s that as the status of Kalael' inoreases, 
the percentage of physicians entering Kaiser from foreign 
medioal sohools inoreases, ",hI1e the percentage fl'om U. B. 
sohools decreases. HOl-feVer, since these two variables are 
only slightly correlated, the oontrol on natlonallty oannot 
be said to explain the original relatlonship bettfeen the 
status of Kalser and the status of its recruits. Rathert 
this control on ascribed status appears to have an indepen­
dent effeot on the dependent va.riable, the achieved status of 
physicians entering Kaiser. 
The third control placed on the first hypothesls was 
length of previous practice, which represents another type of 
ascribed status (Table XII). Thi s control refines the orlgi­
nal hypothesis by revealing one of its limiting oonditions. 
Among physiclans who have not engaged in practioe before com­
ing to Kaiser "'rho have low asoribed status), the 
TABLE XI 

NATIONALITY BY TIME OF ENTRY INTO KAISER 

(Per oent) 

I 
Period and Status ot Kaiser 
1943-53 1954-63 1964-69 
Nationa11ty (Lalor Status) (Middle Status) (High Status) 
Foreign 7% 15% 20%c.-'J 
---« 
:.t'"
-4 93r<''1 U. S. S5 go 
e:; 
, :;:..:! 
~ 
~;,J 
r;:; Total 100 100 100e" j 
~ 
E:: Number 2g 41 79 
C1I:II 
:=.J 
5; 
-C gamma =-0.327 
......, 
\.H 
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TABLE XII 
PRESTIGE OF PHYSICI~~S' MEDICAL SCHOOL BY TIME OF ENTRY INTO 

KAISER AND LENGTH OF PREVIOUS pa~CTICE 

(Per cent) 

1943-53 1954-63 1964-69 
_ (Ltj..!'1~tatus) (M1dd1e_ St a tUG ) _ _tR1gh Status) 
Prest1ge of o Yr. 1 +Yr. o Y!'. 1+ Yr. o Yr. 1+ Yr. 
Medical Schoe1 ~~ct:t£! Practice Practioe Practice Practice Practice 
Lo,'l 44% 44% 54% 43% 65% 45~ 
Hl&-'1 56 56 46 57 35 55 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Number 9 9 11 30 26 53 
n.B. =10 
-.r
.:=­
II 
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relationship between the status of Kaiser and the aohieved 
status at its recruits is strengthened, although it d1s­
appears among physicians Who have practiced one or more 
years (who have high ascribed status). 
As hypothes1zed, both controls on ascribed statuG 
(nat1onality Eind l~ne;th of pruv10ns pre,ctlce) are inter­
related with physicians' ach1eved status. In the case of 
length of prev10us practice, \vhen a recruit lacks this kind 
of ascr'bed status, the likelihood of his reoru1tment varies 
over time with his achieved fltatus. However, when the 
recruit has this kind of ascribed status, the likelihood of 
his reoruitment does not vary over time depending on his 
achieved status--1n all three time periods he io s11ghtly 
more likely to enter Kaiser if he has high achieved status 
than if he has low achieved status. In other words, the 
introduction of this third factor ref1nes the original 
relationship bet\<leen the status of K!:lisel" and the achieved 
status of its recruits by revealing one of its limiting 
conditione. 
In the case of nationa11ty, the relationship among the 
varia.bles is different. Over time, ,,,hether a physician hae 
low or high ascribed status (i.e., foreIgn or U. S. national­
ity), the likelihood of his recruitment depends on his 
achieved status. The third factor of nationality has an 
independent effect on the dependent vBriable of achieved 
status in tho orig1nal relationship. 
II' 
II 
II' 
II, 
II'; 
II 
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Tho active/inactive staff status of physicians who 
have entered Kaiser is the fourth control vrhich was placed 
on hypothe sis one. 'llhi s control serves to refine the 
original inverse correlation found between the status of 
Kaiser and the status of its reoruits. Table XIII shows 
that whereas this inverse relationsh1p is strengthened 
. among active staff, it disappears among inactive staff. 
ThUS, as hypothesized, this control refines the original 
l'elntionship by reviealing one of its lim! tlng condi tiona: 
Among active staff, but not among inactive staff, the 
status of physioians entering Kaiser decreases 8S the 
status of Kaiser 1ncreases. 
QonclusiQ!!!.. A major part of the flr.::llngs for the 
first hypotheSiS has no'" been summarlz,a.d. In these find­
lngs prest1ge of medical school 1s uced 88 an ind1cator for 
a physician's achieved status. With one exception they nrc 
based on the whole universe of physicians l-ibo have prac­
ticed in Ke.iser since 1tlorld War II. 
Contrary to expectation, the findings do not support 
the hypotheSiS that as tho status of Kf:'l.ls61' increa.sed, the 
achieved status of physicie.ns entering KaJ.ser sleo 
increased. Instea.d, it has been found that as the status ot 
Kaiser increased, the e.chieved status of its recruits de­
creased. In other ,,'ords, these v8.rie.bles e.re inversely 
rather than directly related. 
--- --- ---
----
TABLE XIII 
PRESTIGE OF PHYSICIANS' MEDICAL SCHOOL BY TIME OF ENTRY INTO 
KAISER AND ACTIVE/INACTIVE STAFF STATUS 
(Per cent) 
1943-53 1954-63 1964-69 
__( !:!ow StatueL- (l-11ddle Status) ---tHig!LStatu~ 
Prestige or 
Medical Sohool Aotive Inaotive Active Inactive Active Inactl~_ 
Lo't'1 25% 42:& 36% 67% 53% 47% 
High 75 .,k2! 614- 33 47 53 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 

Number g 19 2g 12 60 19 

-J 
-..t 
I 
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The tour controls placed on this hypothesis also sup­
---------! I 
I 
I 
I 
port the negativo findings. The introduction of two of the 
controls, length of practice and active/inactive staff· 
status, led to the refinement of the orIgInal inverse rela­
tion between the status of Ksi.ser and the achieved status 
ot its recruits by revealing its 11miting conditions. In 
'other words, the original relation held only among active 
starf and physiclans wlth no plj>oVlOUB experience practlclng 
I· 
but not among lnacti ve staff s.I~d physiclcms with suoh expe­
rlence. The other tt"O, natione.lity and In-state/out-of­
" 
state locatIon of med.ical school J were fo~nd to have an 
, 
independent effect on the achieved statu~ of physicians 
enterIng Kais er. In other·wol'aS, the origInal relation held 
among both foreIgn and U. S. physl clans and among both in­
state and out-of-state graduat.es. 
These flndlngs are tent~tlve for two reasons. First, 
potentlally important extraneous variabl~s could not be 
controlled. Second, indicators used may be weak. There­
fore, although it is posslble :that further evidence would not 
alter the conclusions "lhich r!e hAve dravTn from our data, 1t 
is also posslble that such ev~dence would lead to other 
lnterpretatlons of the data. 
If additional evldence provlding for more controls 
were available, then any of the folloynng alternatlve lnter­
pretatlons of our data'might 'be callee. for. Flrst, if all 
important extraneous variables could have been controlled, 
'I: 
I 
; 
I 

I 
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the hypothesized relationship bett'Jeen the status of Kaiser 
and the status of its recruits might have been revealed. 
In this case, we would have found that the status of Kaiser 
physicians had in fact increased as the status of Kaiser 
increased. Our first hypothesis would then have been sup­
ported. Second, more adequate controls might have led to 
the explanation of the unexpecteq, relationship l'lhich was 
found between the statua of Kaiser and the status of 1ts 
reoruits. In this case, We would have discovered nn inter­
~en1ng variable between the independent end dependent vari­
ables of OUt' hypothesis. We would then have mod1fied our 
hypothes1s aocordingly. Thir<.l, suoh oontrols might have 
revealed the spurious nature of the unexpected relationship 
which was found betlV'een the status of Kaiser and the statua 
of its reoruits. In this oase, 'We ",ould bave found a con;;; 
trol variable which account ad for both the stetus of Ka,1 ear 
,and the status of its reoruits. As a reoult, it would have 
been neoessary to reject our hypothesis. 
If bettcu' ind1cators for the achieved status of physi­
cians were avatlable, the findings might support the first 
hypothesis. This possibility will be disoussed below fol­
lowing the presentation of findings using indicators other 
than the prestige of B. physician IS medioal school. 
_______ _ ____1 ___________Second Indicator for Achieved status 
The seoond indicator for a physiciants aohieved status 
used in the present study was the prestige of his referenoes. 
I 
go 
Unfortuna tely, due to p!'ooleme of missing information, the 
findings using these ind.icator-s do not apply to the whole 
universe of Kaiser physicians. (For more detail on these 
problems, see Appendix 0.) 
Flnding~. Table XIV shows that the status of physi­
cians entering Kaiser has inoreased as the status of Kaiser 
'has increased. In oontrast to the data where prestige of 
medical school serves as an indioator for achieved status, 
these findings confirm our hypotheSi s. In other \-/orde, 
these data reveal a direct, rather than an inverse, rela­
tionship bet":een the status of Kaiser and the status of it B 
recruits. Furthermore, the association is strong; gamma is 
0.554. 
Because of the large number of cases for which data on 
references were missing, a high degree ot confidence cannot 
be placed. in this finding. There are t'Kenty-nlne cases miss­
ing, twenty from the earliest time period J 1943-53, and nine 
from the period 1954-63. Since the period 1943-53 contains 
data on only eight cases, the poesibility arises that they 
may not be representative of all the physicians who entered 
Kaiser at that time. 
The following data suggest that, in tact, the findings 
tor the time period 1943-53 are not representa,tlve. The 
accompanying diagram (Figure 2) shows the prestige of the 
medical schools of all' physicians who entered K8.1ser during 
1943-53, accord1.ng to "1hother or not they are still 
TABLE XIV 
PRESTIGE OF PHYSICIANS' REFERENCES BY TIME OF ENTRY INTO KAISER 
'(Per cent) 
Period and Status of Kaiser 
Prestige of 1943-53 1954-63 1964-69 
References (Lm.; S'tatus) (Middle Status) (High Status) 
I," ~Low 100% '+'1-, 2Z'h 

Medium 0 31 35 

High 0 25 4-3 

Total 100 100 100 
Nu.rnber ~ 32 79 
n.s. == 29 
gamma :=. 0 .554 
--------------------,-------------------------------"--------------­
<». 
I-' 
2g physioians entered Kaiser, 1943-53 
20 left g stayed 
6 have high 2 have low 
10 lett 10 lett prestige med. prestige med. 
before 1952 after 1952 schools schools 
4 have' 
high prestige
med. schools 
7 have 3 have 6 have 
high prestige low prestige low prestige 
med. schoola med. schools med. schools 
------------_._---_. 
.--------_._-----------------------------­
~re 2. Distribution of cohort of physicians entering Kaiser during 

19~3=5;-Oy active/inaotive staff status, year of reSignation, and pres­

tige of med1cal school. 00. 

I'\) 
~~ 
I 
I ! 
practicing in Kai oer and if nO,t, according to whether they 
left Kaiser before or after 1952. Estimating that data are 
I 
missing fOl" all physicians who left Kaiser before 1952, : !! 
three-quarters of those who left after 1952, and one-quarter 
of those \vho did not leave (see Appendix C), then one seeG 
that the prestige of the medical sobools of physicians for I 
whom data are missing i8 higher than that of physioians for 
whom data are present. If the two indicators, prestige ot 
references and prestige of medical achool, are correlated to 
some extent, then it is likely that the 1943-53 data in 
Table XIV are biased in favor of low status recruits. If I 
, I 
the1943-53 data are biased, then finding en increase in the 
IIstatus of physicians enterinG Kaieer over time is probably an 
artifact of the unrepresentativeness of the data which uee 
prestige of references assn indica.tor for the status of 
physicians entering Kaiser. II! 
.. 

Extranf;ou8 Unoontrolled Variables. 'lbe finding of a 

----------~-------
direot relationship between the status of Kaiser and the 
status of its recruits (when indicated by the prestige .of 
their references) may be mlEllead.ing because the generali tx of I 
this relationship may be limited. As discussed earlier,9 
physicians who have been affiliated with the University of 
i 
Oregon Medical School at one or more points in their' careers ! I 
have been enterlng Kaiser in greater numbers:. ThUS, if a 
control on Univorsi ty of Oregon ref-erances 'Versus other 
9SUDr8, Table VII, p. 65, and pc 61.
--"'--­
I 
I 

---------------------,-----."...-..,......-~~-----------------, ! 
references were placed on the fir!st hypothesi s, then it io 
likely that we would find the folilowing: 1) Among physi­
cians wi th non-Uni versi ty ot' Oregon references there has 
been a decrease in t he statuE of iphysl cians ent ering Ka1 ser. 
2) The frequency of phy sicians w11th Universt ty of Oregon 
references, i.e., high status ret1erences (by virtue of their 
medi cal school aff11iati on) has ilncreased over time. If a 
direct relationship bet\'1een the sltatus of Kaiser and the 
status of its recruits is found only among physicians with 
University of Oregon references, ithen the generality of this 
relationship is severely limited.. Consequently, it would 
I 
not lead us to question the val.iq,ity of the inverse rela-
I 
!tionship found earlier \'lhen prestige of medical school was 
I 
the indicator for a physician's status. 
! 
Third Indicator for AchievedStatuB 
Find1!!g!. The third indicator for a physician's 
achieved status used in the pres$nt study WBS the prestige 
of his hospitals of internship a~d residency. Using this 
indicator, we find that the firs; hypothesis is supported 
(Table XV): as the sta.tus of Katser increases, the etatus 
! 
of its recruits also increases. ,(The correlation is fairly 
strong; gamma =O.3g2.) Data for only fourteen cases are 
missing. Although eleven of them come f:r'om the first t1.me 
i 
period, data on seventeen cases are present for this period. 
Thus, although the accuracy of the previous findings which 
i 
use prestige of references as an indicator seems highly 
I 
---------------------------------------------------------
TABLE XV 
PRESTIGE OF PHYSICIANS' HOSPITALS OF INTERNSHIP AND 
RESIDENCY BY TIME OF ENTRY INTO r~ISER 
(Per cent) 
Period and Status ot Kaiser 
Prestige ot Hospi­

tals ot Internship 1943-53 1954-63 

_ and Re'pi~ncL- !.Low Statusl (Middle Status) 

LOW 53% lS% 
M.edium 41 40 
High 6 42 
Total 100 100 
Number 17 40 
n.a. == 14 
gamma == 0.3S2 
1964-69 
(High Statu!U. 
9% 
48 
43 
--.. 
100 
77 

c:». 
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questionable, there are ftvlfjJr Y.'eas,:ms to doubt the aocuracy 
of the present findings. 
,A Valid Ind;'ca!2,r'l Asm.u1l1ng that these findings are 
representative of the unlvo~se 01' Kaiser physicians, then it 
1s necessary to account for the discrepanoy found between 
these findings and those whel~e pl"est:tge of medical school 
serves as an indicator for the achieved status of physicians. 
Perhaps it arose beoause one of the indicators for achieved 
status is better than the other, or perhaps neither indica­
tor is adequatG by it self. We will discuss these two pos­
sibilities below. 
The di screpancy bet"J'een these two sets of find.ings may 
have arisen because the indicators prestig~ of medical 
school and prestige of hosp! tale of internship B.nd residency 
are inversely correlated. It' flO, physicians from 10ir1 pres­
tige medical schools t'lould have high prestige hospitals of 
1nter~ship and residency. They would have entered Kaiser 
after exporl encing up'~~ard mobility dur1ng their training 
(i.e. t each stage of tra1n1.ng "!tlas taken at a more presti­
gious center of learning). Although each indicatox' 'Would be 
tapping similar a~pects of status, neither would be adequate 
by itself as an indicator for the achieved status of physi­
cians ent er1ng Kaiser. Therefore, thoy "Tould have to be 
combined to form an 1ndex of status. 
The d1 screpancy betlieen the two sets of find1ngs might 
also have arisen because the indicators for achieved status 
were not oorrelll:Gcd. If th~A wel"e the caee, then it liould 
be possible that one indicator for achieved status is bet­
ter -than the other in the cant ext of physicians t job oppor­
tunities. 
As suggested by soverRl informants, the prestige of a 
phys1c1an's medical school may not be an 1mportant factor 1n 
.physicians' Job opportunities. Instea.d, as one 1nformant 
ola1med, the prostige of the speo1alty program 1n wh1ch a 
physio1an receives his residenoy' training as 'vell as the 
prestige of the spec1alist unde~ whom he studies during hi.s 
res1dency may be more 1mportant. In this case, even tho 
1ndioator used in the pres~nt dtudy, the prest1ge of hospi­
tals of lnt ernsh1p and residenoY', l'lOUld not be a sufficiently 
sens1tive ind1catol' of a. recruit's status because it leads 
to a ranking of hospitals rather than of programs and pro­
fessors ,1ithin hosp1tals. Unfontunately, it is beyond. the 
soope of the present study to answer these questions regard­
ing the va11dity of various indicators for achieved status. 
Nevertheless, the questions must be kept 1n mind in inter­
preting the results of this st~dy. 
~~!~l of Data on Achieve~ St~t~~_~f-PhlB1cl~~! 
In sum, the findings'tor the first variant of the first 
hypothes1s--as the statu8(>f Kaiser 1ncreases, the achieved 
status of physicians enter1ng K~18er will 1ncrease--are not 
concluei va. The reasons are d,. 'Verse: 1) Da.ta on the "Thole 
universe of Kaiser phy sic1~ns '-lero available for only one 
gg 
indicator of achlevea status. 2) Different indicators yielded 
contradictory l~esults. 3) Important extraneous variables 
could not be controlled. 
-Although it can be definitely concluc1ed that the 
status of Kaiser- 1s aS6oci8.ted wj th the status of physicians 
enter1ng Kaiser, the direction of the relationship 1s uncer-
tain. When prestlgo of medical schools serves 8S sn indi-
cator for achieved ete,tuB, lie find that the status of phy-
eicial1B entering Kaiser has deol"eased over time.. !n cont!~::~et, 
when prestige of~-:110BpitalH of lntern~hlp and residency' is th:: 
indicator, we find that their status has incroased, sa 
hy~1'" "'-1'-\Osl'>J e A .l",V l.J -,1,('" L;I \..:.. Thus, we cann.ot deflni tely rejeot -this 
hypot h {:; 81 s • 
As hypothesized, national! ty, length of previoul'~) pr'ac-
tics. and active/inactive staff status W9re found to be 
important controls with respeot to the fix-at hypothesis" 
The impor'G8.nca of the In-state/out-of-sta,te location (.'))" 
medical sohool was discovered during the analyais of tho 
data.. Nationality and the in-state/out-ot-state locatio!: of 
a reoruit's medical school were found to have an independent 
effect on the aohieved status of physicians entering Kaiser. 
Length of previ.ous practice and act1 ve/lnact1 ve steff ete,tUG 
refined the original inverse correlation found between the 
status of Kaiser and the status of its recruits. 
The detailed f1nc1111gH wh1ch use prestige of medical. 
school, of hospitals of lntel"'nship aDI} resl(1,en(~y, and. of 
S9 
referenoes as indicators for the achieved status of physl-
cians entering Kaiser are listed below: 
1. As the status of Kaiser increased over time, the 
prestige of the medical schools of physicians entering Kai-
ser deoreased. 
R. Controls on nationality (as an indioator for 
ascribed status) and on the in-state/out-ot-state location 
ot a recruit's medical school had an independent effect on 
the prestige of 1'1e(n'auits' medical schools. In other words, 
among both fore1gn and domest1c physicians and among both 
in-state and out-or-state ~Taduate8, the achieved status of 
physicians entel'alng Kaiser decrea.sed over time. 
b. Controls on both active/inactive staff status 
and length of previous practice (as an indicator for ascribed 
status) refined the inverse correlation between the status of 
Kaiser and the status of its reoruits by revealing its limit-
ing conditions. In other vlOl~ds, the relat10nship held only 
among aotive staff and among physicians who had no previous 
experience practic1ng. 
2. As the status of Kaiser increased over time, the 
prestige of the references of physicians entering Kaiser 
increased. (The va11dity of these findings 1s doubtful.) 
3. As the status of Ka1ser increased over time, the 
prestige of the hospitals of internsh1p and residency of 
physicians entering Kaiser increased. 
II. DATA ON HYPOl'HESIS ONE ~~EN ASCRIBED 
STATUS IS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
The second variant of the first hypothesis states th&t: 
As the status of Kaiser increases, the ascribed status 
of physicians entering Kaiser will increase. 
The following two indicators for ascribed status were used in 
the present study: nationality and length of previous prac-
tice. As stated earlier, foreign nationa11 ty indicates 101'; 
status; U. S • nationality indicates h1gh status. Slmilal-'ly, 
the lack of any exper1ence 1n practice indioates low status; 
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one or more years experience indicates high statue. We wlll 
begin our discussion of the ascribed otatus of physicians 
entering Kaiser with the findings which use the first 
indicator. 
" First Indicator for Ascribed Status 
-------~-----------~---
The findings in Table XI, ,,'hen nationa11 ty l8 the 
indicator for ascribed statu8 1 are opposite to those hypoth-
esized: as the status of Kaiser has 1ncreased, the percent-
age of physicians with high ascribed status (U. S. natlonal-
i ty) enter-lng Kaiser haH decreased \4]1111e the peroentage l-;ith 
low asoribed status (foreign rmtlonallty) has increased. In 
other words, as the status of Kaiser has increased, the 
ascribed status of physic1ans entering Kaiser has decreased 
(gamma = -0.327). Instead of a direct relatlonshlp as 
hypothesized, we find an inverse relationship between the 
status of Kaiser and the status of its recr~its. 
Without proper controls, the conclusion tha.t the 
asoribed status of Kaiser recruits has deoreased is tenta-
tive.' Data found in Rayack illustrate how critioal a con-
trol on the changing compos1 tlon of the roedl,cal pl"ofesslon is 
for the interpretation of data involving graduates of foreign 
medical schools: 
The impact of immigration 1s also shown in medical 
licensure data. Between 1940 [1950] an~ 1959 for-
e1.gh graduates recei ving 11 censure as a pel"centage 
of the total licenses granted ;'08e from 5.1 to 
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19.7, almost a fourfold increase. lO 
In the present study data on the percentage increase in for-
eign graduates \';ho became specialists in pri vate prHctloe 
would be needed in order to conclude definitely that t~e 
twofold 1ncrea8e~ 1n foreign graduates enter1ng Kaiser 
between 1943 and 1963 represents a decrease 1n the status of 
Kaiser recru1 t s. 
Se~n(1_I~9:1 c?-tor .L~E_Ascrl !?£d .~.!~ tu 8 
Table XVI reveals an lncon 81 st ant correla.t ion batt-Teen 
th~ status of Kaiser and the ascribed status of its recruits 
as measured. by length of previous practice (gamma = 0 .OB9) • 
Although the ascribed status of physicians entering KalseI~ 
deoreases between the second and th1rd time periods, it 
increases between the firat and second per10ds _ (No pl"evl-
ous practice indicates low status; one or more years of 
practioe indicates high sta.tus.) 
The accuracy of this finding must be questioned. Since 
data are missing for ten cases in the first time period, this 
period 1ncludes data on only eight een cases. HOl'leVer, th1s 
problem can be dealt with by introducing a control on aotive! 
inactive staff status. This will allow us to isolate the ten 
missing cases among inaotive staff; the data on active staff 
lORayack, p. 123~ The data on which this statement 
was baaed {p. 12r~) reveal that 1 t is in error. Rayack should 
he"ve been descr1b1ng the perlod from 1959 to 1959 rather than 
the period 1940-59-
TABLE XVI 

LENTGH OF PREVIOUS PRACTICE BY TIME OF ENTRl: INTO KAISER 

(Per oent) 

Per10d and status or Ka1ser 
Prev10us 1943-53 1954-63 1964-69 

Practice (Low statUB) (M1ddle status) (High Status ) 
o Xr. 5C~ 27% 33% 
j1 or More Yr. 50 73 67 

1 

.",~"~.,,,~ 
·-~otai . ·100- J.OO 100 

Number 19 41 ·79 

n.B.. = 10 

gamma : o. og9 

N "" 
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will then be complete. 
Table XVII shows that the introduction of a control on 
active/inactive staff statue reveals the interrelation be-
tween the statue of Kaiser and the ascribed status of its 
reoruits. Among active staff, as the status of Kaiser has 
1ncreased, the ascribed status of its recruits has decreased. 
HOl'lever, among inscti ve staff, the rela.tionship betl'leen 
Kaiser's status and the ascribed status of physicians enter-
lng Kaiser is inconsistent, as it was 1n the original cor-
relation befor'e the control 't~ElS lntroduced( Table XVI). 
Again, the findings fa.iI to support the fir-st hypoth-
esis. Among active staff, the status of Kaiser and the 
ascr1bed status of its recruits (as measured by length of 
previoua practice) are invel~8ely rc;:~thel~ than directly 
related. L1ke't~lse, in the previous findings where natlonal-
1 ty served as an indicatol' for a.scribed status, these vari-
ables were inversely related. 
Summ'§El-.2L~at~ __ p'n Ascrlb~S!_~!atus .2f Phl!!.!~.!~n9 
Contrary to expectation, we have found that as tho 
status of Ka.isel"! incl~eased, the ascribed status of physic1ans 
llActually one case 1s still missing from the active 
staff data. Comparison of the nmaber of cases miss1ng from 
Table XVI and Table XVII OhOliS that whereas 10 cases are 
missing from Table XVI, 12 cases are miss1ng from Table 
XVII. As intended, the introduction of the control on 
active/inactive staff status allowed us to 1solate the 10 
cases originally miss1.ng from Table XVI. In Table XVII 
these cases appear in the data on inactive staff but not in 
the data on active staff. However, 1n the process two 
additional CBses turnod up missing. Since one of these is 
TABLE XVII 
LENGTH OF PREVIOUS PRACTICE B7l TIME OF ENTR7l 
AND ACTIVE/INACTI.VE STAFF STATUS 
(Per cent) 
INTO KAISER 
Previous 
Practice 
o :tr. 
1 or More Yr. 
Total 
Humber 
191+3-5;(r..,Ol'T status) 
Active Inactive 
... J:2%-. 
.. ~% 
gS 11 
-
100 100 
g 9 
1954-6; 
.c M1d.dle status) 
Active Inactive
.. 
-
25% 33% 
75 67 
-
100 100 
?S 12 
n.a. =12 
1964-69 (H1gh Status) 
Active Inact1ve 
;a~ ....Jt~ 
70 5S 
- -
100 100 
60 19 
'I.D 
.f:." 
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entering Kaiser decreased. The detailed findings are listed 
belo",!: 
1. As the status of Kaiser has increased, the per­
centage of domestic recruits (\<lho! he.ve high ascribed status) 
has deoreased, while the percentage of foreign recruits (,~o 
have lOti asoribed status) bas increased. 
2. Among active staff, as the status of Kaiser has 
inoreased, the peroentage of Kataer reoruits who have been 
in praot1ce one or more years (i.e., who have high asor1bed 
status) has decrensed, \'lhile the percentage of physiCians 
who have never been in practice (i.e., who have low ascribed 
status) has increased. 
III. 5UMlwIARY: HYPOTHESIS ONE 
Earlier, in summarizing the 1'1 rst part cf the findings 
on hypothesis onf; (in \vhich the dependent variable is the 
achieved status of physicians entering Ka15er) t we notod that 
the findings were inconsistent and. inconclusi vee \fuen pres­
tige of medical school lias used as an indicator for achieved 
status, an inverse relationship wa.s founcl between thG status 
of Kai ser and the status of its recru1ts. HO\oJever, when 
prestige of hospitals of 1nternship and residency was used, 
a. direot relationship was found. 
In oontrast, the findings on the second part of hypoth­
esis one Cw·/here asoribed status is the depp,ndent varlablc) 
are constat ent. They shOl'T that ~e the status of Kai Ber haa 
inoreased, the ascl'1 bed status of physiCians enter1ng Kaiser 
has deOl'eased. In other l'1ords, these variables appear to be 
missing from the data on active staff, these data are not 
quite complete. 
I, 
inversely rather than directly related. On the whole, a 
variety of eVidence has been presented supporting the con­
clusion that the status of physicians entering Kaiser haa 
decrea.sed l'lhile the status of Kaieer has increased. Thi e 
includes data wnich use three di vcr'se indicators for the 
status of physlciano: prestlge ot medical school (llThich was 
based on an informant ranking), nationality, and length ot 
practice. It alao includes data where four different oon­
trols B.r-e placed on the first hypothesis. 
In contrast, there is llttl'e evidence showing that the 
statuB of physicians entering Kaiser has increased. It 
lnvolvea t"to indicators for otatus, prestige of references 
and prestige of hospitals of internship ~nd residency, which 
lire essentially simil~~r in that they are both based on the 
AMA rating of teaching hospitals. 
~fuereas the findings ~~lnst the first hypothesis aro 
based on three diverse indicators for status, the f1ndings 
for the first hypothesis are based on only one kind ot 
indicator. In other words) the former set of data is more 
heterogeneous than tho latter set of data. Therefore, it 
appears that the first hypothesis of this study should be 
rejected.. 
CHAPTER IV 
FINDINGS: POSITIONS OCCUPIED BY DOCTORS 
PRIOR TO ENTERING KAISER 
In this chapter data on the second hypothesis of this 
study will be presented and discussed. We will discover 
that there are slightly more findings against this hypoth­
esis th.9.n for it and that there is no discernab1 e pat tern to 
the pos1tive and negative findings. As a result, we w1.11 
find it difficult to dravl any general conclusions about the 
Circumstances, if any, under which this hypothesis is suc­
cessful. It will also 'be difficult to dra\1 any definite 
conclusions as to why the find1ngs are so highly inconsis­
tent. Perhaps some of the indicators were pOOT; perhaps it 
would have helped to use controls. In the last section of 
this chapter, we w111 discuss each of these conjeotures. 
The second hypothesi s of this study is as follot'iS: 
As the status (ranle) of Kaie,er increases, high otatus 
recruits will less frequently come from statuses 
(posit1ons) with intrinsio rsw8.rds similar to those 
found in Kaiser. 
Indicators were needed for the stntus of Kaiser, the status 
of physicians, and positions offering intrinsic rewards 
similar to those found in Kaiser. The indicators for the 
9S 
status of Kaiser have alreaCly been discussed. l Prestlge of 
medical school ",as chosen as an indicator for the sta.tus of 
physicians instead of prestige of references or prestige of 
hospitals of internship and residency. As discussed 
earlier, the data on the first indicator are more completo 
than the data on either of the other two indlcators. 2 I. 
Before indicators for positions with intrinsic rewards 
similsr to Kai ser I s could be chosen, the intrinsic re\V'ards 
associated with an active staff position in Kaiser had to be 
identified. Five such rewards are the opportunities for 
1) a more scientifio practice, 2) a change, 3) more educa­
tion, 4) easier aCC6SS to facilities, and 5) living in the 
West. Given these intrinsic re~1ards of Kaiser, it was pos­
sible to generate five predictions from the second hypothe­
sis. Each of these predictions is distinguished by its 
dependent variable, which consists of one of five types of 
positions defined by the intrinsic reward of each. 
Indicators \'lere then sought for fi ve types of posi­
tions \<,lth intrinsic rewarcls nimilar to Kaiser IS. Tl<IO indi­
cators were found for positions offering the opportunity for 
a more scientific practiclJ; two indic8.tors tlere also found 
for positions offering the oppottunity for more education. 
Three Here found for positions offering the opportunity for 
a change. One indicator was found for pOSitions offering 
easier access to facilities; one was also found for a 
l~~~~, pp. 35-39. 
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position offering the opportl.1nj.ty to liv~ 1n the \·lest. 
Thus, although only five prect1ct1ono '';81'e generated frol:.1 the . Ii 
I I 
: I second hypothes1s, nine ind1cf].tora were identified for its 
independent variable. 
Discussion \<1il1 vegln Y11th the findings \-lhich support 
the second hypothesis. These findings concel'n two out of 
.the five pred1c.tions ~'lhlch ~lel~e generated from this hypoth­
esis. These two predictlono pertain to physicians \~'ho 
entered Kaiser from positions offering the opportun1ty for a 
: I 
I Imore scientific practice and from positions offering the 
I i 
opportunity for a ohange. 
It must be noted that in all but one of the tables in i i 
: I 
this chD.ptel"' at lea.st seven cases are m1ss~.ng from the first : I 
time periOd. because relevant data on these physicians \OTore 
not available. In some tables the total number of casee : I 
I I 
missing is highel". This occurs e1ther because informa,tlon is II 
miss1ng on many physiCians or because the categories in the 
table do not apply to the entire universe of Kaiser 
physicians. 
I. D..A.TA FOR HYPOTHESIS T1JiO 
Posl.~1ons Offeri.~~ the O..,.upo£,tun1ty for 

a MOl"'e Scl~nt_1Xl.~. .l~r:actlc~ 

First Indicator. One ot the intrinsic re~~rds of 
. ---­
Kaiser is the opportunlty to prov ide more scientific care. 

The first indicator for a pos1.tlon pl"'ovld.lng similar rel,rard.s 
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1s prev10us position emphasizing the soientific rather th.o:'l.n 
clinical aspects 01' care. Table XVIII showa that as the 
status at Ka1ael" bas increased, high status recruits have 
less frequently COrne from positions with scientific and 
mixed scientific-clinical orientations, lm11e they have more 
i'requently come from positions l11th clinical orientations. 
As hypothesized, high status recru1ts have decreasingly come 
from positions with intrinsic rat-rards similar to Kaiser's. 
Second Indicator. The second indicator for positions 
Offering the opportunity to practiCO mor.e scientifically is 
specialty or scientific socie-ty memberships. Again, the 
findings support the second hypothesis (Table XIX). As the 
status of Kaiser has increased, the peroentage of high statue 
physicians entering Kaiser with one or more specialty or 
scientific sooiety memberships has deoreased, uhile the per­
centage without any such memberships has increased. In 
other \<Tords, the percentage of high status reoruits ,\fho have 
ocoupied. positiona \V'ith intrinsio re\vards similar to 
Kaiser's has deorensed over time. In sum, the seoond hypoth­
esis is supported by findings involving both indicators for 
posi tiona "Thich, like Kaiser, offer the opportunity for a 
mOre soientific pr~ctioe. 
Posi tions Offer~ng. t.he Qppol~tun1 ty for a Change 
First Indicator. Entrance into Kaiser involves the 
intrins1c rei-;ard opportunity for a change. A series of 
posi'tions clli"tracterized by the ga.me re'\flard is a cal"eer at 
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TABLE }''VIII 
SCIENTIFIC/CLINICAL ORn:NTATION OF PREVIOUS POSITION 
BY Tn-iE OF ENTR'Y INTO KAISER AI·tONG 

HIGH STATUS PHYSICL\NS 

(PCI' cent) 

Period and statue 01 ~~laer.... I__ ___ 
Orientation 
of Prev10us 
Posit1on 
1943-53 1k~1 sta~us) 1954-63 (Middl.! status) 
1964-69 
Oi1Q'h ate.tus )
__t;C:"_,......... • _ 
C11n1cals 19% 19% 24% 
So1ent1fic­
CllnlcalD gO 611­ 60 
Sc1ent11"ioo 10 IS 16 
Total 100 100 100 
Number 10 22 3g 
n.a. := 7 
aprevlous positIons with clinical orientations to 
care include the G.P., military doctor, public health phy­
slclan, physician in IndustI'ial or 1nsurance medicine, B.nd. 
the administrator. 
bprev10us positiona \<1'1 th scientific-clinical oriente.­
tions to care include the specialist in private practice, 
hospital practltioner: private aeei.stant, intern, resident, 
and post-graduate studunt studYing clinical practice. 
0Previous positions with scientIfic orientatIons to 
care Include the group practitioner, teacher, researcher, 
and the post-graduate student doing research. 
TABLE XIX 
SCIENTIFIC AND SPEC!ALTl SooIET! MEMBERSHIPS BY TDfE OF ENTRY 
INTO KAISER A~!oNG HIGH STATUS PHXSICIANS 
(Per cent) 
Period and status of Kaiser 
Sc1entificS and 
Specialty Society 194-3-53 1954-63 1961+-69 
J 
I
Memberships (LOi"... status) O·!1ddle status) (High Status) 
o 1'5~33% 1J.5% '+ ? 

1 or l-Iore 67 55 55 

Total 100 100 100 

~lumber 12 20 29 

n.a. = 16 

aExamples or sCient1fic professional sooieties are the following: the American 
Association for the Advancement ot SCienoe, American SOCiety for Clinical Research~ 
and the V~yo Foundation for Medical Education and Research. 
.... 
o 
ru 
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changes ln locatlon of practice. Table XX oummarlzes the 
flndlngs relevant to this lndlcator for posltlonu offering 
the opportunlty for a change. As the status of Kaiser 
lncreases, the percentage of hlgh status recruits who ~~ve 
changed the location of thelr practice one or more times 
decreases i in contrast the percentage ,-rho hava never mavael 
the!I' practlces increases. In other '>lords, high statuo phy­
slcians are less frequently entering Kaiser from careers 
involving intrinsio rewards simllar to Ka1ser's. 
Second Indicator. Another indicator tor posltions 
offerlng the opportunity for a change ls a career involving 
one or more changes in specialty. Table}au reveals that as 
the status of Kaleel' has increased, the pSl'centage of high 
status reoruits who have changed their specialties ono or 
more times has decreased, while the peroentage who have 
never made such a change has lncreased. Thus, hlgh status 
recruits have less frequently cOme from careers 1nvolv1.ng 
lntrinsic rewards simllar to Kaiser's. 
Thlrd..Indlca tor. A career characterized by changes in 
activities is yet another indicator for posItions offering 
t e opportunity for a change. In contrast to the flrst two 
i dicators for such positlons, this one yielded negative 
f nd1ngs. Table XXII reveals that as the status of Kalser 
s increased" the pel"centage of high eta,tuB physlcians 
ehtering Kaiser "Tho have engaged 1n t'ltl0 or nore d.ifferent 
types of activity since comp19t1on of theil' residency 
TABLE XX 
CHANGES IN LOCATION OF PRACTICE BY TIME OF ENTRY INTO 
Y~ISER AMONG HIGH STATUS PHYSICIANS 
(Per cent) 
Period and Status of Kaiser 
~hanges in 
Location of 
Practice 
o 
1943-53 . 
(LO~l Statu~ 
S% 
1954-63 
q-1iddle Stat~sl 
50% 
1964-69 
(High Status) 
50% 
;;.1 
1 or More 92 50 50 
Total 100 100 100 
Number 12 
n.a. -= 218. 
16 2g 
\ 
aThe cases of no information are high not only because of missing information 
but also because some physicians enter Kaiser who have not yet begun to practice and 
as a consequence have never had the opportunity to change the location of their 
practice. 
._------------­
b 
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TABLE XXI 
CHANGES IN SPEClALTX' BY TIME OF ENTRY INTO 

KAISER AMONG BICtH STATUS PHYSICIANS 

(Per cent) 
Period and status of Kaiser 
Changes 1n 191.J.3-53 1951t-63 1961.J.-69 
~eo1alty (Low ste. tUG) (I-l:1ddle status) (Hl~h Sta,tu!L 
o 60.0% 6g.2% 6g.4% 
1 or Hore 40.0 3l .S 31.6 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Number 10 22 :;S 
n.a·;:7 
--------------------------------------...--------------­
TABLE XXII 
CHANGES I~! ACTIVITIES BY TIME OF ENTRY INTO 
KAISER Al·l0NG HIGH STATUS PHYSICIANS 
(Per oent) 
Period and Status of Kaiser 
----------~---~~ -­
Changes in_ 191~3-53 1951.J.-63 1964-69 
Actj.vlt1esB .(~ow ate. tUB1 .t!'t1dd~e ~t.atus) (Hi@_sta~u~ 
... --- ­
o 70% 46% 14-7% 

1 or More 

-2.9.... -2L -21._ 
Total 100 100 100 

Number 10 22 3S 

n.B. ':: 7 
i\D1ffcrent kinds of actlvity 1nclude the follo;'11ng:
private practice, group practice, hospital practice, practice 
1n the public hea.lth asrv1c3 Or Vetera.ns Adzn.1nistratj,on, prac­
t10e :In the al"r.:lsd forces, teaohing, research, postgraduate 
training, practice as a private assistant, and adm1nistrat1ve 
medio1ne. 
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training has increased, lfhile the percontage \-rho 'have en­
gaged in only one type cf e.ct1vity s'.t1ce their residoncy has 
deoreased. Contrary to e~~ectation, high statuE physicians 
have t10re frequently entered Kaiser from careers involving 
intrinsio re't'lards similar to Kaiser's. 
In BUrnt we find that the seoond hypothesis is sUPPol'ted 
by two out of three indicators for positions or sets of posi­
tions l'lhich, like Kaiser, otfer the opportunity for a cfI..ange. 
On the balance, we conolude that these findings support the 
seoond hypothesis. 
Summa£l 
The findings "lhleh support the second hypothesis are 
listed belOW. They include both indicator» for positions 
offering the opportunity for a more scientlfic practice but 
only t\"10 of the three lndicators for positions offering the 
opportunity for a change. 
1) As the status of Kaieer increa.sed Over time, high 
status physiCians less frequently ente:red Kaiser fl"'om 
positions emphasizing the scientifio and sclentific­
clinical aspects of care; they more frequently en­
tered Kaiser from positions emphasizing the clinical 
aspects of care. 
2) As the ste.tus of Kaiser has increased, the per­
cents,go of high etatus recruits \-li th mC~lbel"ships in 
scientif.ic or ep;;lclv.lty societies has el,ccl"eased, 
while the percentagEI \'11 thou't Buoh mernbe:'ships has 
increased. 
3) As the status of Kaiser ~.s increased, high statue 
physlcia.ns who have ct't.anged the loeation 0 f their 
pra.ctice have less frequently entered Kaiser; those 
who have never made such A. chango have more fre­
quently entered Kaiser. 
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4) As the status of Kaise~ increased, the percentage
of high status reoruits ,·tho had changed. their specialty
decreased, Hhile the pel'centage of reoruits who had 
never made such a chD.nge increased. 
In general, as the status of Kaiser increased, high 
status physicians less frequentl:v entel"ed IO;.lse:r trom posi­
tions and careers which, like Kaiser, offer opportunities 
for change and Bcientific practice. The findings oonfirm 
two of the five pI'edict1ons which were generatod fl"om the 
second hypothesis. 
II. DATA AG~,\INf3'r HYPOTHESIS TilO 
The findings which fail to support the second hypoth­
esis concern predIctions about physicians 't-rho entered Knissl' 
from positiona offering opportwlities fer more educe.tion, 
for easier access to tacil1 tiesJ and for living in the ~7est. 
All of the ind1cators for these pos1t10ns cons1stently 
y1elded nega t'.vt" firJ.d1ngo. t~~beso f1nding& are su.l1liJ1al"i~eti 
belOW: 
1) As the status of Kaiser has increased, high status 
physicians '1ith postgl.'adue,te train1ng r..ave mOl'S fre­
quently entered Kaiser, while physicians. without such 
training have less frequently entered J~i8er (Table
XXIII). 
2) As the status of Kaiser has increased, the percont­
age of high status recruits who have had five or more 
years of tl'a.lning has 1ncreased, while the percenta.ge
who have had less training has decreased (Table XXIV). 
3) As the statuB of Kaiser has increased, high status 
physicians r~ve mOre frequently entered Kaiser from 
careers in bureaucratic contexts; they t..a.ve less fre­
quently oome from careers 1n private practice (Table 
XXV) • 
I 
Postgrad.uate 
~aininga 
o Yr. 
1 or l{ore 'Yr. 
Total 

Number 

TABLE XXIII 
POSTGRADUATE TR.4.INING BY TIME OF ENTRY INTO 
KAISER AMONG HIGH STArl'US PHYSICIANS 
(Per cent) 
Period and Status of Ka1ser 
1943-53 (Lo\'1 StatUB) 

90% 

10 

100 
10 
1954-63(Middle Status) 
62% 
3g 
100 

21 

1964-69 
(H'.gh StatU3). 
6S% 
32 
100 
3S 
n.a.:: g 

apostgraduate training refers to medical training, excluding medical school, 
1nternship, and residency training. 
.... 

o 
~= 
01 
Length ot 
TrG..i.ninga 
O-ll- J.rs. 
5 or }!ore"Xrs. 
Total 

Number 

TABLE XXIV 
LENGTH OF TRAINING BY. TIME OF ENTRY INTO KAISER AMONG HIGH 

STATUS PHYSICIANS 

1943-53 (Low atatus ) 
70% 
30 
100 
10 
(Per oent) 
Period and Status of Kaiser 
1954--63(Middle Statue) 
54% 
46 
100 
22 
n.a .. ~ 7 
1964-69 (H1gh stat'Us) 

55% 

45 

100 
3g 
ALons'b ot t~a~nins ~et.~1 to tbc tQt~l numbe~ ot yea~e 8~ent in internship,
res1denoy, and postgraduate tra1n1ng. 
...... 
o 
'" 

------
--------------------------
TABLE XXV 

BUREAUCRATIO/NONBUREAUCRATIO OONTEXT OF CAREER BY TIME OF ENTRY 

INTO KAISER AMONG HIm! STATUS PHYSICIANS 

(Per oent) 

Per10d and Status of Kalser 

Context of Career 
NonbureaucratlcS 
Bureaucratlcb 
Total 

Number 

1943-53 (Low Sta!us) 
60% 
40 
100 
5 
1954-63 
(Mld~le Sta~ust 
47% 

53 
100 
15 
1964-69 
(H1gh Status) 
2~% 
72 
100 
25 
n.a. = 320 

SCareers in nonbureauoratl0 oontexts refer to oareers ln private praotice. 
bCareers in bureauoratlc oontexts refer to oareers spent ln one or more pos1­
tions where faoilities are oentralized and lnoome 1s received in the form of a 
salary. Training and military servioe are not oonsidered to be part of a physi­
oian's oareer. 
°There is a high number of eases ot no information beoause they inolude 25 
physicians who entered Kaiser just after completing their training and military 
.....service, ..... 
o 
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4) As the status ot Ka1ser has 1ncreased; higb status 
recruits have mOl:'e frequently come from medical schools 
1n the North Central a.nd \,ieste!'n states, l:lhereas they
have leEls fl~equently come from schools in the North­
east. The percentage coming from the South has varied 
inconsistently over time. :en sum, a.lthough 1n the 
last time per10d most high status rec~uits came trom 
North Central schools, over time the locttt1on of 
recru1ts' schools has var1ed from East to \'lest (Table
XXVI) • 
In sum, as the status of Kaiser has 1ncreased, high 
status physicians have more frequently entered Ka1ser frOID 
pos1tions and careers wh1ch, like Kaiser, offer opportu­
nities tor more educat1on, tor eas1er accese to facil1ties, 
and tor liv1ng in the West. These f1ndings fail to support 
three ot the five pred1ctions wh1ch were generated from the 
second hypothesis. 
III. DISCUSSION 
The f1nd1ngs both for and aga1nst the second hypoth­
esis have nO\-1 been presented in full. The evidenoe confirms 
two of the pred1ct1ons l>1hlch '''''ere generated from this hypoth­
ea1a, but fails to conf1rm three othel"s. In other vlords, the 
f1nd1ngs are 1nconolstent. 
Furthermore, we have not been able to discern any pat­
tern to the posit1ve and negat1ve f1ndings, l>lhich 'tv-ould allo"" 
us to account for the success of certain predictions and the 
lack of success of others. Although a var1ety of conclu­
sions m1ght have been dral"n from the data, 't';e lack the evi­
dence \vhlch \-!O~ld be ne.eded to cboose among them. Thus weJ 
do not knOt1 lihether to accept B.ll the find1ngs a B valid or 
II 
112 
TABLE XXVI 
REGIONAL Il>OATION OF MEDICAL SCHOOL BY TIllE OF ENTRY 
INTO KAISER AHONG HIGH STATUS PHISICIANS 
(Per cent) 
Period and Status of Kaisor --------~~~~~~~~~~~;~~~.---------
Location of 
Medical Schools
. ~ 
1943-53 
(LOir1 status) 
~-. ._­
1954--63 
(Middle stat:as t 196~·-69 (H1~h StatU~l 
Northeast 59% 37% 20% 
South 6 16 6 
North Central 29 31 62 
Weat 6 16 12 
-
To"tal 100 100 100 

Number 17 19 31t 

aThis reg10nal breakdo'\rn of the United States comes 
from the follol-T1ng source: U. S., Bureau or the Census, 
U. S. Census of the Population) 1960: Characteristics of 
the POE,!!la t10n, IlJS't. AI Number orTnliii13I"feJlitS" (HashIng'fon,
D. C.: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1961), I,02_ 
bThe seven cases of m1ssing infor~atlon represent
high status physicians from foreign medical schools. 
only some 01' them, that is, only the pos1tll.ve or only the 
neg8. tive f1ndings. In other wordE!, the fimtings are i.ncon­
elusive. 
Although "fe are unable to drairv any general concluslona 
as to why the find1ngs are incons1stent, \V'e can offer aug·· 
gestlons abou·t part1cular cases of negative findings. In 
I 
II

, , 
I 
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the following discussion, VB will speculate about ways to 
account for some of the flndl~gB against the second hypoth­
esis. Two possible sources of arror will be d1scussed: 
1) the validity of Indicators used jn certain pred1ctl~n8 
and 2) the absence of controls on exogenous factors which 
might be lnt errelat ed wl th the var1ebles used 1n certain 
prad1ct10ns. 
Both 1ndicators for posit10118 offering the opportunity 
for mere education, i. e., postgr-aduat e stu'iJllSnt ami a career 
involving extensive training, y1elded nega\:ive findings. 
One reason ma.y bi) thnt the opportunity for more educatlon is 
an incentive for mobility for only certain kinds of 
physicians. 
Two types of si tuat10ns can be suggested in wh1ch the 
incentive value of ·th1s reward would vary. First, the 
opportuni ty for more educat10n mfty be an inrportant intrinsic 
re\'lard only for physicIans' ",ho want to take their Amerioan 
Specialty Board Exams 1n order to obtain cert1fication but 
'/ho f1rst need to do additional study. Second, it may be 
impol"tr<,nt only to lou status physicians enter1ng Kniser but 
not to high statuG phys1ci(;1.nc. For any givan set of physi­
cIans, 1t may be 1mportant to see the opportun1ty for more 
education provided by Knisel'" as one 01" El set of alternatives. 
For instance, although Ka.iser may be 'able tc offer better 
I 
I 
I ' 
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educational opportunities than pr1vate practice, it probably 
offers poorer. opportunities than teaching or researoh. Sup­
pose that many high status physioians l'lho apply tor posltiona 
in Kaiser have a ohoioe between practioing In KaiDer B.na. 
teaching or doing research. Then the opportunity for more 
education lIQuId not be a Dignlflca,nt intrinsic revrard ot 
Kaiser trom their point of view, although it might be fl"'om 
the pOint of view 01' a low status reoruit. 
In sum, it haa been suggested that the opportunity for 
more education 1s an inoentive for mobility for only certain 
kinds of physioians. If this assertion is corrent, then it 
may aooount tor the nagatlve findings vlhich \'lere based on 
the assumption that the opportunity for more education is an 
intrinsic rel18.rd for all physioians. 
i'pe Changin~ Specia.l,!!y ComE-osition o~ 
Kaiser; A Needed Control? 
The prediction conoerning physicians who enter Kaiser 
trom positions of'tE;r1ng the opportunity for- more education 
may have yield~a negative flndings because important exoge­
nous variables 'tvero not controlled. Rayack states that l 
"The average length of tr·a.ining for doctors after" completion 
of medical school has increased from about two years in 1940 
to about thr~e-and-one-halr years in 1959. 1 ) Furthermore, 
)Elton Rayack, PrOfessional Pouer and American Nedl­
oine: The Eoonomics of the Am"erlcan l;realcal" Association 
(OleveIand-:The" "vorld P'ub11shing COiiii)'a.ny-;-1967), p. 112. 
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be argues that this incl'eflse 1s a product of the trend 
to,-;ard specialization. I'f his e,nalysis is correct l then it 
indicates the need fOr aoontro!J. on the changing spec1a,lty 
compos1tion of Ka.iser over time. 
Perhaps the high status physicians entering Kaiser 
I 
have increasingly been speoialists in specialties where the 
ave:eagEt length of tra1nil1lg is long. This: 'uould ind1cate 
, 
that the increase 1n Ka1~er reerulte l11th: extensive training 
ls due to ohanges in the' specialty compo8
'
itlon of Kaiser. 
I 	 , 
Thus, a control on th1s exogenol',s varlable	I i.s needed. to find 
I 
I 
out l*lhether within each group of opecia11sts (each group be­
lng deflned by the average length of tra.~nlng of phys:tcians 
I 
wlthin it) high status physicians have m~re frequently 
I 
entered Kaiser with mor~ or less tralnlng. 
The Changi!H?': C~mpos:ttioa of Pos,i t1ontL, ln' tt~ ~.§p.ical Profession: A IeededControl'/ , 
The predictlon concerniqg physic1ahs who enter Kaiser 
from posit1ons oftering'easler access to faci11ties yielded
I 
, 
negative find~.ngs. The! 1ndicator tor such posit1ons \'laS a 
I 	 , 
career ln fI, bureaucratlcI context. A po~sible reason for 
these negative flnd1ngs, 1s that no contl'ole ",ere placed on 
the changlng compos! tioh of poai t5.ons iry the medlcal 
profession. 
Data found in Rayack r'fwenl the necossi ty tor such a 
control. Rayack documents \lnat he calls the "organizational 
revolution in medical ~ra.ct:1.ce. n He states that, HAs a 
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result of these developments, the doctor bas become an organ­
lzatlon man, n4 and oi teE! the gro'rlth of both group and hospi­
ta.l praotice as evidenoe. Hie data reveal the increasing 
employment of physicians in other kinds ot bureaucratic con­
texte as well: 'ihila the percentage of physicians who were 
Interns, residents, or full-time hospltal staff increased 
from 6.2 per cent in 1931 to 16.5 per cent 1n 1962, the per­
centage in teaching, administration, industry, government 
serVice, and retirement inoreased from 7.9 to 19.0 per 
cent. 5 
In sum, 1t appears that the availability of positions 
1n bureaucratic contexts has increased and thus that the 
composition of positione in the medical prG:t:'esslon has 
changed. The finding that the peroentage .Q1' high status 
physicialls entering Kaiser from careers in bureaucratic c·on­
texts has Increased Over time may be an eft&ct of the chang­
Ing oompositlon of positlons 1n the medical profession. 
Therefore, a control Is need.ed. on this exoglll'lOUS variable. 
The chang1ng composit1on of posltions 1n the medical 
profession may have affected another findirlE; 1n the present 
study. The finding 1 s that of an increase in the percentage 
of high etatUG physicia.ns en taring Kaiser WiIlO have changed 
actlvlt1es one or more times since completlmg their resi­
dency training. A change in actlvity 1nvol'ics either a 
~Ibi~~1 pp. 39-40. 5Ibid., p. 46. 
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change betrleen different bureaUcl'atlc contexts of act1vity, 
such as from teaching to group pl"'8.ctice J or a change bet\~een 
bureaucratio and nonbureaucra.tic contexts, such as from pri­
vate to hospital practice. (See Table XXII ror more detail.) 
If the availability of pOs1tions 1n bUl'eaucl'a tic contexts 
has increased) then it is likely that there has been a con­
'comitant increase in the opportunity to change activities. 
Accordingly, the inoreasein the percentage of high status 
physicians entering Kaiser fmo have changed activities one 
or more times may reflect th1s increased opportunity for 
change rather than a difference in the kind of physician who 
enters Kaiser. Again, a control on thechanglng composition 
of positions in the medical profession 1s needed • 
•Summary 
Since no overall pattern could be discerned in the 
findings for and against tho s~cond hypothesiS, it remains 
unclear why certain prediotions generated from this hypoth­
eeis tlera successful and others \'Tel'9 ndt. TherefOl"e I our 
discuss10n of the findings involved speculation about par­
ticular cases rather than a general interpretation. Prob­
lems of invB.licl indlcatol"S and- extraneous uncon.. .;rolled vari­
ables 1'1ere focused upon. Suggest~.ons were mde as to the 
. , 
tmys in which they could have influenced some of the findings 
against the second hypothesiS. 
I I 
CHAFTER V 
OONCLUSIONS 
In retrocpeot, the nature of the present study oan 
best be desoribed ss exploratory researoh. Tbe literature 
of medioal sooiology served as a basis for defining a prob­
lem concerning prepaid group practice which, although worthy 
of sociologica.l investigat1.on ~ had never been studied before. 
A theory was then seleoted to deal with this problem, hypoth­
eso(~ wel"'e generated, a design was ohosen I and data l'lere 
collected. 
However, prior to data oolleotion, no preliminar'y 
examination was made of data relevant to the prclJlem. 
Acoordingly, it is not aurprlfl1ng tha.t by the tlme the study 
had been compl~ted, many r!ew ldeas for a bett.)r researzh 
design and for slt ernst1vo: hypotheses had emerged. Thus) 
the fruits of the present study undarline the nee~ for 
exploratory research. The present study w1 th 1t s genorally 
inconclusive and negative findings io of \sluo only insofar 
as it oan be used to deSign an. alternative study of prepaid 
group health plana. 
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I. SUMMARY OF ITHE STUDY 
Problem 
As a result of thcA.'1A18 oppoai tion ttl prepaid group 
health plans, it 1s likely that these plana experienced d1f­
fioulties in reoruitment after they were established. As 
opposition was relaxed, these difficulties probably dls­
appearE:d. Assuming thlltohll.ngcc in the Eloe1e.l oharacteris­
tics of physioians enter1ng prept;lid group health plano 
reflected changes in recrui tment i problems t then it is likely 
that the kinds of physicians who enter these plans have sys­
tematically varied over time. 
Such variation presents a problem for research, namely, 
to inquire into the direction of and reasons for the va.ri­
ation. The task of the present thesis was to "solve" this 
problem. 
C~~E1u~!~~ation of the~Probl~ 
Althougb previous studies ,had not don& so, the entrance 
of phyolcians into prepaid group health plans was concep­
tualized as mobility between di~ferent contexts of work 
(c.g., solo pre.ctlco, prepaid group practioe, medical schools, 
hospitals, the public health service·~ eto.). The theoretical 
JUBt1fioation for this conceptu~lizat1on l'1B.! thnt the defini­
tion of mobility, "Jl1ovement of persons • • • through the 
social structure, f!1 Was bl"'oad enough to include movement 
between different contexts of work. 
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The empirical Justification c~~e from a study by 
Wilensky. His factor analysi s of mobi11 ty sholved that the 
change between self-employment and 1"lorking for an employel· 
(or vice versa) represented one dimension o~ mobl11ty.2 
These f1ndings suggested that the movement of physicians into 
solo versus prepaid group practice involves one dimension of 
mobIlity. For these reasons, it appeareo. legitimate to 
conceptualize the entrance of physicians into prepaid group 
health plans in terms of mobility. 
!.!!eo~ an~-B.~l1e~_~! 
'l~le topic of this study was the longitudInal v8.1~1~'.tlon 
in the social charaoteristics of phys1c1.ans entering prepa:ld. 
group health plans. Given this topic, the research obJec-
tives were to generate a set of hypotheses to describe ~nd 
partially a,ccount for changes in the types of physi"c1ans \'\rho 
have entered prepaid group health plans over time. Blau's 
exchange theory) particularly those sections, on mobil! ty and 
recruitment, proved to be the most fruitful source of 
lnSOc1al Structure, Mob1lity, and Development," Soclal 
Structure and Mobil1 ty- in Economj.c Develo:ement, ed. by-Nefr-
;r:-Bmelser-and Seymour-Martin Lfpset-rCh1cagoT Aldlne Pub-
l1sh1ng Company, 1966), p. 2. 
2Harold L. v111ensky) uMeasures B.nd Effect s of t-1obll1 ty, II 
Soclal S~~uc!.~.r_~~~~}1(~~f?11~~X., ed,. Smelser and Llpset, 
pp. 110-111. 
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hypotheses for th1s study.3 
One of the bAsic propositions of exchange theory 1s 
that ind1viduals and collectivities follow the most proflt-
ab+e courses of aotion. Profit 1s defined in terms of.the 
balance betl"ICen reHards and cost s (1. e. I reSOU1"cea gained and 
lost). Rawer-de can be of tll0 basic types--extr1nsl0 and 
intrins1c. Extrinsic rewards, e.g., money, can be used in 
any s1 tuat1 on; the benef1 t s of intrinsio revlsrds, e. g. , 
sooial aooeptance, can be gained in only one given situation. 
The extrinsio rewards associated with a given posit1on or 
colleotivity define the sta.tus, or rank, of that position or 
colleotivity. 
The first hypothesis of this study was based on two 
propositions ,.,hlch ~lere gener-ated from Blau r 8 discussion of 
the relationship of extrinsic ret'lards to mobility and 
reoruitment. Blau states that for a given indiv1dual mobil-· 
1ty 1s dependent on his hav1ng the opportunity to receive 
higher rewards. Such opportunities depend on the status ot 
the lndivldttal before mobIlity: high status gives an 
ind1 vidual a great er opportuni ty than a1 ther middle or low 
status. The follo\~;lng proposition 1.ssuggested: Oppor-
tunities for: hlgher reuards lead to mobility of high status 
individuals. 
3Peter M. Blau, Exchange and Power in Social Life (New 
York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 196rn, p~294=30~--peter 
M. B1au, "The Flow of Ocoupational Supply and Recruitment," 
ASR, XXX (1965), 475-1~90. 
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Blau also states that for a given collect1v1ty the 
allocation of more resources to recruitment depends on suc-
eeseful competition. Since successful compet1tion involves 
an increase 1n status for a collectivIty, the following 
propos1tion 1s suggested: As the status of a collectivity 
increases, the rel"lards which l t offers recrul t s will also 
1ncrease. 
This proposition together with the preceding one sug-
gested the follo't<11ng hypothesis: 
As the status (rank) of prepaid group health plans 
inoreases, the status (rank) of physicions entering 
these plans will increase. 
This hypothesis ~le.8 refined by distinguish1ng the various 
criterIa, i.e., achieve~ent and ascription, which govern the 
distribution of extrinsic rewards: 
As the status (rank) of ~'epaid group plans increases, 
a) the achieved status of physicians entering these 
plans will increase and b) the ascribed status of 
these physicians will increase. 
Intrinsic as ,"1el1 as extrins1 c rewards may serve as 
incentives for mobility. According to Bleu, intrinsic 
rewards vary in the degree to \'ihlch they sel~ve as incent1 ves 
for mobIlity, depending on the experience which an individual 
has had with these rewards in previous statuses (positions). 
Accordingly, one might expect that the kinds of intrinsic 
retvards rece1 vcd In prevlous statuses affect· the kinds of 
individuals who are mobile. Assuming that both intrins10 and 
extrinsic rewards interact in influencing xob111ty, the fol-
lowing hypothesis 1s suggested: 
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As the status (rank) of prepaid group health plans 
increases, high status recl--ul t S \<lil1 le;ss froqu ently 
come from statuses (social pos1 tiona) wi th intrinsic 
rewards similar to tho se found in prepaid group plans. 
~o~~ge of_Data and pe~!gQ 
The main source of data for the prese.nt study was the 
personnel records of the Portland Ka.iser Foundation Health 
Plan. These reoords inoluded applioations tor starr Member-
ship, a few letters of reference, copies ot personnel adver-
tisements which w'ere placed in the medical journals, ,1ob 
1nqulrl 1es, and an official schedule of start,lng salaries by 
speoialty. Two minor sources of data used to supplement the 
information in the reoorda \I10re the ,AlYlA'S !!me!.!.£~!2-Me~lcal 
!?ire0E.£;:Y., and ~ireot~~L~~~2.Y.~C! Intern.~~~l2.!~!2~}!ef!i­
denoiee. 
---
The design for this researoh was a longitud1nal case 
study. Data "lere presented on the universe ofphys1oiane l;;hcl 
had practiced as full-time, salaried staff In Kaiser at any 
time since 1945 when Kaiser was first opened to the public. 
This included a few physloisns 11110 entcredKft1seI~ before 1945 
when the Health Plan was being run on a striotly war-time 
basis, and this exoluded physloians who practiced in Kaisel'a 
only during th{~ l'ISr years. Since the klnds of variables 
which could be extraoted from the records were nominal and 
ordinal variables, oross-tabulation was used in the presenta-
tion and analysis of the f1ndings, and gamma wes used as a 
measure of association bet"leen orcllnal vari,&bles. 
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Indicators 
Indicators were needed for four variables: the status 
of Kaiser, the achieved status of physictans, the ascribed 
status of physicians, 8.nd positions \dth intrinsio revmrds 
similar to those of Kaiser. Beoause of the small size of 
the 'universe of Kaisel" pnys101ans (N:.: l4g) , it seemed prac­
tioal to look at var1a.tions in the s·tatus of Kaicer in terms 
of lOll, med1um, and high status pel'! ods. Thus, indicHtors 
. were needed. to ShO';1 not only the direotion but also the tim­
ing of changes in the status at Kaissr. 
Two indicators were used to determine the direction of 
changes in the status of Ke,.tse;r over time: 1) the ratio of 
unaccepted applicants to staff! position openings in Kaiser 
and 2) 8. comparison of' the rat/es ot' increase in the starting 
salaries of Kaiser specialist~ to the rates of increase in 
the incomes of self-employed ~?ysicians under sixty-five. 
The data on both revealed that the status of Kalser haa 
, 
inoreased over time. The timing of the changes in the statue 
of Kaiser was evident only from the seoond indicator since 
data on the first indicator were limited to the period from 
1959 to 1969. Aocordingly, it was found that during the 
period. from 19/.l·3 through 1953 Kaiser had low status: 1954-63 
wa.s a period of middle status; ft'om 1964 through 1969 the 
status of Kaiser wa.s high. 
Two indicators were used for the accr1bed status of 
physicians end threG were ust1d for their ach1eved status. 
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The prestige of physician s' medl cal schools, of their hospi-
tals of internship and residency, and of the1r references 
ware used as indicators for achieved status. ~~e prestige of 
medical schools Was determined from informant ratings C?f the 
schools. An official Al·iA rating of hosp1 tele found in the 
~!reo~o!:l_2.f._~EEQ.:Y£~ In!~rnst.!~_a11:d Re~!.de!.1.£!~!! \trae used as 
a measure for the prestige of hospitals of internship and 
residency. The prestige of references was inferred from the 
prestige of the1l' organizational affiliations. Again, tho 
AMA rating of hospitals ';85 u~ed as a basis fOl" determ1ning 
the prestige of these organizations. 
Ind1cators for positions with intrinsio rewards similar 
to those of Kaiser were found by first identifying intrinsic 
rewards assoc1ated with 8~ posi t ion 1n Kaiser and then by 
identIfying positions offering similar rewards. Accordingly, 
the following indicators were selected: 
Intrinsic Rewards 
of K.aisel') 
--.-----~--- .. - ... -.. -.,. ....... --... -. 
Opportunity for more educa-
tion 
Opportunl ty to proy-id.e morte 
sc1ent1.flc CHre 
Opportunity for more con-
venient aO(~OBS to 
facl11tles 
Opportunity to live in the 
West 
Positions Offering 
Similar Re,\.,ards 
---------------
Postgraduate student 
Career involving extensive 
training 
Speoialty or scientific soci-
ety memberships 
Previous position emphasizing 
scientific rather than 
clinical aspects of care 
Career in bureaucratio 
oontext 
Medical school student in the 
West 
Intrinsic Rewards 
of Kai ser 
.-~------------
Opportunity for a change 
E!ndin~ 
Positions Offering 
Similar Re~vards 
-_._-------_. 
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Career of ohanges in special-
ties 
Career of changes in location 
of practioe 
Career ot ohanges in activ-
ities -
The evidence for the first hypothesis Was generally 
negative. It 1ndicated that although the status of Ka1ser 
.had increased over the years, the status ot physic1ans 
entering Kaiser had decreased. This conclusion \'Ias reached 
on the basis of findings using prestige of medical school as 
an indicator for achieved status as well as findings using 
nationality and length of practice as indicators for ascribed 
status. It was further supported when aotlve/lnactl ve staff 
status and length of pract1ce were introdueed as third fac-
tors. Both these controls served to reveal the limiting 
conditions of the original relationship. In revea.ling an 
independent effect on the status of Kaiser recruits, controls 
011 na~iona11 ty and In-state/out-or-state loc'B.tion of medical 
school also supported the original finding. 
The findings using prestige of hosplt~ls of 1nternship 
and residency and prestige of references as indicators for 
achieved status showed that the status of physicians enter1ng 
Kaiser had increasod ovel' the yeal's. Ho'tv6ve;r, thel~e ar6 __ 8 
number of l"'easons t'or qUestioning the validlty of these 
findings: 1) None of these data. apply to th:9 ~'lhole un1.verse 
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of Kaiser physicians--from forty to seventy per cant' of the 
c~ses from the fl~8t time period ere missing. 2) The dis-
crepanoy between these findings and those Just descrlbed may 
reflect the different methode used to rank medical scnools 
and hospitals. 3) Based on three dlverse types of indi-
cators for status, the findings ~ainst the first hypoth-
esis appes.r more persuas1 ve than the findings f!?!: the first 
hypothesIs, which are based on only one kind of indicator. 
The evidenoe for the second hypothesis 1'1SS 1nconclu-
sive: it indioated that as the status of Kaiser increased, 
the percentage of high status reoruits froa certain posi-
tions \"11 th lntri.nslc rellal'tds similar to K~lsert s deol'teB.sed, 
whereas the percentage from other positions increased. High 
status physicians have less frequently entered Ka1eeIl a) hav-
ing held positions emphl\siz1ng the sc1entl'fl0 aspeots of 
cSl'e, b) having memberships in scientific (l·r speoialty 
societies, c) having ohanged the location of their pr~.c-
t1co, and d) having ohanged their specialty_ They' have more 
frequently entered Kaiser a) having had pcu;,tgraduate train-
ing, b) having had at least five years of 'raining, c) hav-
1ng held jobs in bureaucx'stlc contexts J d) having gradu-
ated from medical schools in the North Central and Western 
states, and e) having engaged in t\vO or mox'e different 
types of activities. 
The only discernable pattern in thes'a. data 1s that 
among multiple indicators for positions of:ter1ng a given 
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intr1nsio rel.,ard, the findings are genel"ally consl st ant. 
Nevertheless, no pattern uh1ch would allow us to account 
tor the success and lack of success of indicators related 
to oertain intrinsic rewards is apparent in the positive and 
negative findings. 'lhere appears to be no rea.son.to suspect 
that either the pos1tive or the nogatlve find1ngs are 
invalid. Furthermore, assuming that all the findings are 
valid, no theoretical explanation is evident for these 
seemingly oontradictory results. In sum, the find1ngs for 
the second hypothesis are inconolusive, and they Will not 
be discussed further. HovTever, aome Bugge:stlons will be 
made as to the theoretical significance of the rlndlngs 
pertaining to the fl rst hypothesi 9. 
II. DISCUSSION 
It ha.s become evident that the first hypothesis of 
this study must be rejected. However, it does not neces-
s!U'11y !.ollo\~ tha.t Blau I s theory of mob111.ty must be 
1:1b[~nd.oned. Perhaps the lack of success of' this hypothesi S 
1s due not to in8.d.equ8.o1es in Blau I B theoT7 but to the fol-
lO\(ing factors. F'irst, the hypotheses of this stud,y 
represent much simplified versions of Bla~'s theory. They 
poorly refleot the 1nterrelationship of the factors which 
in theol'Y influence mobility. Seoond, the empirical prob-
lem with which this study deals, i.e., varfations over time 
in the types of physicians entering prepaid group practice, 
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might have been poorly conceptv&lized. In light of these 
two potential sou~caa of error, the conclusion is not war-
ranted that the use of exchange theory in the context of 
mobt'lity between d.lfferent \</ork contexts 1.8 inappropriate. 
The findIngs of this study do not necessar-11y call fOl" the 
rejeotion of Blnuta theory of mobility. 
If Blau t s theory of mobIl1 ty need not be rejected, 
then perhaps exchange theory can be used to suggest a fac-
" tor explaining the unexpected rela.tionship found bet'lleen 
the status of Kaiser end the status of its recruits. It 
'11111 be argued that such e,n explanatory tactor 1s the 
intrinsic reward involving the opportunity to participate 
in an innovative torm of medioal practice. 
It was stated earlier thht in general Blau considers 
extrinsic rewards to be more iinportant incent1 ves for 
mobi11ty than 1ntrinsic rewards. However, this implies 
that in oertain 81 tuat10ns intrinsio relvards are more 
1mportant. Perhaps such a situation was the opening of the 
Kaiser Health Plan in Portland, inasmuch as Kaiser was one 
of the first prepaid group health plans 1n the.United 
States and claimed to be an innovative form of medical 
practice. 
Assume that the opportunity to participate in an 
lnnovatl ve form of medice.l pl')actloe \lllG the most important 
lncenti ve for mobili ty lni tlally offered by Kaleel". Then 
the following question arises: what kinds ~r experiences in 
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other positions liould lead physicians to find the oppor-
tun1ty to innovate rewarding' Perhaps, as Romans argues, 
it 1s the experience of high status .1~ If so, then the 
early importance of the opportunity to innovate in the his-
tory of Kaisel:\ would account for the high peroentage of high 
status physioians "'Tho entered Kaiser from 1943 through 
1953· 
Like the extrinsic rewards cffered by Kaiser, the 
intrinsic rewards of Kaiser may have changed over the 
years. If at one time Kaiser ceased to provide the oppor-
tunity to innovate, then this would aocount for the decreas-
ing status of physic1ans enter1ng Kaiser after 1953. 
Up to this point we have argued that changes 1n the 
intrinsic rewards of Kaiser are related to changes in the 
status of phys1c1ans entering Kaiser. It also seems plaus-
ible to ar~~e that certain intrinsic rewards, namely, those 
involved in the fulfillment of the goals of an organization, 
are related to the extrinsic l'teliards off'ered by the organi-
zation. F'or instance, if the pl)lm~u'\y operating goal of 
Kaiser were low cost medical care for the patient, then 1t 
1s likely that pl"~orlt8 made by the organization would be 
used to cut the patient'smedioal expenses. However, it 
the goal were to make the income of Health Plan physicians 
4George Caspar Homan 8, ~£Q.!~l Bef!~"~'1q!:L_!~ s ~le~~.n_-: 
tarLE2.!:m.! {Ne'w York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 19b1) , 
p. 352. 
131 
competitive with those of private practitioners, then 
profits would pl'obably be used to increase physicIans I 
salaries and bonuses. 
From this example it is clear that intrins10 rewards 
associated with the fulfillment of the goals of an organi-
zation may be interrelated with the extrins1c rewards 
offered by the organization. If the opportunity to inno-
vate involved the opportunity to plaoe the interest of the 
patient above the interest of the physician, then it seems 
reasonable to suggest the follor,-ring hypothesis: As the 
1ntrinsio rew'ards of Kaiser changed, the extl"lns1c re'h'ards 
also ohanged such that the star~lng salarieo offered 
recruits were raised. 
In sum, the following interrelationship among the 
intr1nsic rewards 'of Kaiser, its status, and the status of 
ita reoru1ts has been suggested: 
ohange in intrinsic 
rewards, i.e., oppor-
tunity to innovate 
change in extrinsic 
~ rewards, 1. e., start 1ng 
~ r salaries 
~. change in the status of 
reoruits 
In other words, by revealing the spuriousness of the inverse 
relationship found between the status of Kaiser and the 
status of its recruits, the factor of intrinsic rewards may 
serve to explain this relat1onship. 
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III. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESF~RCH 
Beoause of the negative, inconolusive findings of the 
present study, further research into the problem of changes 
in the types of physici.ans ,.;ho enter prepaid group practice 
is needed. If future research into this problem is to be 
more successful than the present study, the follo'~111g sug-
gestions must be heeded: 
1) The design of such a study should include a control 
group of private practitioners. The findings of such 
a study would then be les8 tentative than the findings 
of the present study. 
2) Multiple sources of data on physicians should bo 
used. For instance, curricula vitae, letters of ref-
erence, notes from telephone conversations, as wall 
as application forms could be used to ga1n informa-
tion on physicians in prepaId group health plans. 
This would lead to the discovery of the errors whioh 
are likely to be found in any given source of data 
and allow the researcher to deal with them. 
3) Alternat1 ve 1ndlcatol:"s for physicians t achieved 
status should be tried out, e.g., the prestige of a 
physician's preceptor, an index reflecting the aver-
age prestige of a physicians' ohanging organizational 
arfl11atlons, and an index baaed not only on the 
prestige of:the lnstl tutlon \4!here a Ka'.ser applicant 
and his reference were colleagues but also on the 
rating given the applicant by his referenoe. In light 
of the contradiotory results whioh \tlero obtained from 
the variety of ind1cators used in the present study, 
it seems that the alternative indioators suggested here 
might be more useful. 
4) Nel" hypotheses should be formulated, perhaps using 
intrinsic rewards as &1 1ndependent variable. Hope-
fully, they would be supported by the evidenoe. 
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APPENDIX A 
DATA ON JOB INQUIRIES AND JOB OPENINGS IN KAISER 
TABLE XXVII 
DISTRIBUTION OF DISCONTINUED JOB INQUIRIES AND ADVERTISED JOB 
.QPENTNGa INl<AISD. OVEli TIME 
...~!222 1960 1;261 !2.§.g. ~ ~ !2§.2 ~ illI ~ 
,'''" 
..... tJ--JoJ-H---.: ..- ..~.- ~':fJ:3u,,: T02 u ''-TglfmT3~:'-cr~:' '=-~~iilF··':'-=--·ij:Inqu1r1es 3 9 
Source: The source ot these data 1s-Kalser's records of personnel advert1se­
--:a:c-.----..-.,.­ ,.-,-~ . ...-""'~Trl-EHr~ .. 
~:=:....____~~-~......, __ »~.........._~~~~-.e....~~I'P_~lP.'IIr."..,'It:I'~~~~~....-.,.----~........---.....------. 
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APPENDIX B 
INCOME DATA 
I • INCOME O~' SELECrfED GROUPS OF PRIVATE 
PRACTITIONERS 
TABLE XXVIII 
MEDIAN NET INCOMES OF SELECTED GROUPS OF 
SELF-EMPLOYED PHYSICIANS UNDER 
SIXTY-FIVE, 1959 AND 1963 
Phlf?i£!~~_Q!:£!!E. 
Speoialists 
Specialists, 
under 10 Years 
of Pra.ct1oe 
All Physicians 
_!2.22.... 
$211-, goo 
22,300 
22,100 
!:!!l!!~~l a!!.-2!:ou.E, 
Physioians, 
under 5 Years of 
Practioe 
Phys1cians, 
5-10 Years 
of Practice 
All Physicians 
l.C' 6; -~-.-.. --...... 
$17,450 
25,950 
25,050 
Source: The 1959 income data come from P~slclan8' 
E~~nlE!gE._.B.!!.~ExEen8e8: _~ ReJ2r1n.t of Artl~lee ~~8ed or! ---
1rM~9:!.£~.!_.Ec2!22rnlc s nr~!.!,nu!r~E~~!~l.J.....!22Q [Oradell, N.J.: 
Rad1cal Economlcs;-!nc., 19501, pp. 9, 10,14. The 1963 data 
are from "Results of' Me.~!.~~!~Q0!2.2.~.!£~~ First Annual Checkup 
of Phy:slcians I Economic Heal th, Tr ~~9:ical EC0!20mi~, November 
2, 196~·, pp. 104, 106. 
Year 
-
1951 
1961 
1963 
1961} 
1965 
1966 
196'7 
19GB 
1969 
13g 
II . COMPARI SON OF 'r',fO SOURCES OF DATA ON KAI SER 
SALARIES AND INf.'gHE:NGES ABOUT MISSING 
SALARY D;;TA 
TABLE XXIX 
LONGITUDINAL COMPJ\RISON OF STARTING 5ALARIESfi 
OF KAISER RADIOLOGISirS (n) AND OHTHO:PEDIC 
SURGEONS (ons) AS REPORTED IN TWO 
SOURCES Ob" DATJ\ 
Official Personnel Ads 1n 
_2~lal~l_ S£!!Qdule_ Ke'!.~~lll:..~2-l.!rjl.E). $. __ 
R OHS R ORS 
$lO,t500 $10 ,gOO 
19,OOO 
$20,000 
20,000 ~·")O Qf>O \i'~ , \,' 
21,~OO 21~,ooo 24,.000 24 000 , 
24,000 
30,000 30,000 
30,000 30,000 
30,000 30,000 
8These starting salary figures are re-poI'ted 8.t the 
board-certified level. 
139 
fl'ABLE'YJ{X 
STARTING SALARIES O~ KAIBBR RADIOLOGISTS AND ORTHOPEDIO 
SURGEONS OVER TIME B.ASE~D ON COHBIliATION OF Dll.TA 
FROM OFFICIAL SALAHY SCHEDULE AND RECOF..DS OF 
PERSONNEL l\DVgHTISE14ENTS 
Starting Se.lar-iee 
!ea;: of Rand ORSa 
-------
1951 $10,eOO 
1961 l.g,OOo 
1963 20,000 
1964 20,000 
1965 24,000 
1966 24,000 
196'7 30,000 
1969 30 ,000 
1969 30,000 
aIt 3. S &SBUHli;}c1 that tht;1Se figures app'roximat e the 
median Bf.: .. ltl1'ioa of radlolog1. st s ~).nd ox~thop7Jd1 c surgeons at 
Ka1ser (3B0 the disoussion on pp. 45-46). The salaries of 
radlo1Clgtets t~ncl or.·thopedlc tH.lrgeons are close to those ot 
the meet highJ.y puld specla.list s at Ke.leor. 
S()'lol!"CO: DutjB, from e.n official schedule of Kaiser 
ealel"'lcf.1 Hnd. !':ro.n PGcords of personnel adve:rtisement 8 Wero 
.!:1 ("',",·l. -"'y'l'-r) B f t- . 1 t comparou l8,~'J .. e, A ..... A. ecause 0 he mEU17 ns ances of 
identic!),). 1nf'ornC1.t.~u:Hl in the t'¥lO sets at d20.ta a.nd beoause 
of the hi.gh degx'f;;'!o of cons! at enoy bet\'ieen them, (there \-T8.S 
only c'r!fJ di sOl·ep~}.nc;y), l t S t'),emed feasible t.o combine them. 
Therel)y, more comr;r(~hen Ei VB s~tlary de.ta \'le-:re obtalned. 
Furthermore, bI.3Cau::~E! of the high agreement bet\1een the 
schc<lu10s for J's.d:lologi.sts l':.nc1 orthopedic £urgeona \lllthln 
both sets of data, it seemed reasonable to assume that 
thes~ two specialtice had identical selary schedules. 
Aocordingly, tho data on those specialties were also 
ccmblnecl. 
III • ABSOLUTE COMl)j\.RISON OF INCO!~1ES OF KAISER 
SPEOIALISTS AND l)HIVATE PRAClrITIONERS 
TABLH~ XXXI 
LONGITUDINAL COMPARISON OF ST.P..RTING SALARIES OF ONE 
GROUP OF KAISER SPECI.~!.LISTS (IM .... GS-OBG-PD) TO 
MEDIAN NET IN COMES OF SELF -Er·1PLOYED 
PHYSICIANS UNDER SIXTY-FIVE 
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Income of Self-
Years 
Start1ng Salary 0b 
!~!ser_~~ia~~8t _ Years ~~£12.lJ! d Phl.~!.£ 1an 
--- ---
1949 $ g,400 191.).7 $ S,744 
1953 10,gOO 1951 13,150 
1956 12,000 1955 16,017 
1959 13,200 1959 22,100 
1.962 16,200 1962 24,300 
1965 21,200 1964 2g,3g0 
SIt will be noted that the years from which eaoh set 
of income data oome ara not identical. The years for which 
the Kaiser data are reported were chosen not only to cor-
respond to the data on self-employed physicians but also to 
compensate for the Kaiser policy. of interspersing period1.c 
large salary inoreases 'tIl th pelliods of no salary inoreases. 
bFo:r.t reasons explained in the text (pp. 45-47>, those 
startlng sala.ry f1gures for the IH-GS-OBG-PD gro~p of Ka! ser 
apec1a11gts are interpreted to be representative of the 
medlnn start1ng salary of the Kaiser physlc1e.n. 
Souroe: The Kaiser data came from sn official sched-
ule of starting salar1es. The 1947-62 data on self-employed 
physicians came from "Physicians' Economic Health, IS Medical 
EconomicD, November 2, 1964-, pp. 64-65; the 1964 data came 
rrcm-E~lt6n Rayack, Professional POl'tar and Ame!'lcan Medioine: 
'rhe Economics of theAmerican-11edlcal--AsSoc1atlonTOleve-lana: 
'rne WorIa--Pubn·tih1ng-Company;-196rr;-p:-IfO:----
APPENDIX C 
UNANTIOIPATED PROBLE;!·1S 
The main SOUI'Cf~ of data on Kaiser physicians used in 
the present study \'ras the application fOI' staff membership, 
a standardized form filled out by all Kainer physicians. 
It ties ohosen instead cf physicians I curx'lcula vltae on the 
asaur.1ption that it ,,,ould provide more systemat~ .. c and com-
plete information on each physician than the curricul:a. 
However, as shol'm by the data, th1.s assumption vias false. 
In retrof.peot, it appears that the neoision to use the 
applioation forms as a SOlll"ce of da.ta was not sound. 1 
In the follow1ng discussion three pll!toblems which the 
use of the application forms raised will be described. Two 
questions will be posed with reference to each problem: 
1) Did it lead to systematio or random var1.atlon in the 
completeness of the data? 2) D1d it lead to systematic or 
random errors in the data? In this "vlay tif) \tIlll assess the 
lFrom tho standpoint of research strategy, it 1s 
lmpor"tri.nt to understand. hOlf this H1 tuation arose. TV-TO fa.c-
tors seem primary: the researcher's lack of experience in 
working with different sources of data and the necessity of 
working through an 1ntermediary in order to gain access to 
the data. As a result, the researcher never went directly 
to the various sources of data. Lack1ng ths opportunity to 
determine the informat1on in and the merits of each, the 
researcher never gained experience ,\'11th the sources until 
after the decision to use one of them had already been made. 
extent to which these probltms effeot the validity of the 
find1ngs of the present study. 
I. FIRST PROBLEM 
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The first problem which \~as discovered concerned the 
bureaucratio use of the appl1cation forms. The so-called 
"applications for staff member'shlp" are not used as applica-
tions for actlve staff status 1n Kaiser, since the physi-
cians do not fill them out until after they have already 
assumed active staff status. Instea.d, the curricula vitae 
are used as application forms. During the time that person-
nel deoisions are being made, the latter provide written 
information about the physicians. After the physicians have 
already become Kaiser staff members they fill out the "e,pp11-
cation fo!' staff membership," \'lhich seems to represent a 
'bul:'eaucl"latic procedure for information storage end l·etrieval. 
The bureaucratic use of application forms for informa-
tion stor~1ge and retrlevalpr'esented a pr-oblem for this 
study: 1 t appeared. that informat1.on \-'ss miss1ng from the 
fOl-:.rns e.s a result of the use to '-lhi ch the forms were put. 
This became apparent from the instances when ~he curricula 
v1.ta.t3 '-lel'a found 'Wi th the application forms. In comparison 
to the appJ.i cation forms, the curricula pro"';lc1ed more com-
plete and systematic information on the physicians. Thus, it 
E'~ppeRI·ed that the curricula, in serving as applications, are 
filled out "ll th more C.9,re tha.n the application forma, ,,,hose 
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only purpose 1s record-keeping. 
Unfortunately, it 1s not known whether this problem 
1ntroduces systematic or rendom variation into the complete-
ness of the data for this study, as in only 8 few instances 
was compar! son of the application fOl'tms nnd current currio-
ula vitae poss1ble. No eVidence of systematic variation was 
.d1 soovered 1n the course of dS.ta gather1ng. In other words, 
it did not appear that either the kind or the extent of 
lnrol'~mation missing for eaoh physician lias correlated "11 th 
his status (rank) or with any other variable used in this 
study. Hovlever, the limited ev1dence aV'al1able allows no 
general conclusion about any variation whIch might have 
been introduced into the oompleteness of the data. 
Nevertheless, it is likely that the use of the appli-
cation forms as a source of data ~or this Btud~ introduced 
coding errors into the data. Compar1son of the currioula 
vitae to the application l:'"orma shovled that lnt erpretatlons 
of the data which ''\Tere ba.sed on both these sources of d8.ta 
were different from those based on only a single source. 
Howevel~:t since the curricula vi tee were genex·c.lly unavail-
able, it waslmposslble to compere tho currioulum of each 
physician to his e.ppJ.1cation form in oreler to eliminate the 
coding errors which would result from the usa of the appli-
cation forms alone as a source of data. Consequently, the 
use of the application forms as a SOUrC(1 of date. probably led 
to errors in the data of this study. 
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Since it 1s not known whether cases of miss1ng infor-
mation are randomly or syotematlcally distributed within the 
universe of Kaiser physicians, 1 t 1s also unknown \'lhether 
the coding errors \-lhleh result from the missing information 
are r.sndomly or systematically distributed \IIi thin the uni-
verse. Therefore J there is no ''lay to assess the dogree to 
which the validity of the 1~eBult8 of this study is effected 
by the problems of mlss1.ng information t1hlch arise from the 
bureaucratic use of the applic!~tlon fOl'''ms. 
II. SECOND PROBLEM 
~'he second problem which l'\TaB discovered involved 
bureaucratic changes in the format of the application fOl"IT!B" 
The various forms which Wel"e used over the years oall for 
d1fferent types and amounts of information on each phys1-
2 
cian. As a result, some items of informatlon are miss1ng 
for phYSicians who filled out ~ertain types of application 
forms. 
2~rhe earliest source of information discovered for any 
physlci.fln lias not G·ven a form but merely a typed sheet of 1n-
f6rmat1on covering training, professional societIes, and cer-
t1fle8.tton. The first appl1cation form asked for training, 
practlce~ certif1cation, ~nd m1l1tary service. Neither of 
these two sources of data were dated. 
Ovex' the years, two other application forms were used, 
each of which asked for the same kinds of information. One 
was put into use about 1955 and seems to have been tilled. out 
annually unt5.1 1959. In that year the Bess Kaiser Hospital 
1n Portland W&s opened to replace the Vancouver, Washington 
hospita.l, and tho appllcatlon form \iTh1ch is in current use 
waf=; introduced.. The sti~ff l':ho transfel'1lrso. from Vancouver to 
Portland filled it out once. After 1959, new stafr aleo 
filled it. out only once upon entry into Kv.iser. 
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The problem of bureaucratic changes 1n the format of 
the application fOl")illS clearly introduced a systematic bias 
into the completeness of the data for this study. Compar-
ison of the information 1n the most recently introduoed 
torms (1959) reveals that physicians loJ'ho entered Kaiser 
after 1959 filled them out much more completely than physl-
'clans l'Tho entered Kaiser befol"'O 1959 and \V'ho filled out the 
torms in 1959 upon transfer to the Beas Kaiser Hospital in 
Portland from the hosp1 tal in Vancouver. \)'1 th regard. to the 
forms used before the current type of appl1cat1on fOl"m ",as 
instituted (i.e., before 1955), the more recent forma oon-
tain more information than tbe oldel' forms; furthermore, All 
these forms contain les3 information than the current type of 
form. 
These comparisons show that the earlier a physician 
entered Kaiser, the higher the probability that data on him 
are not complete. In other words, the completeness of tbe 
data on any physician verles according to the time he entered 
Kaiser. Since beth the status of Kaiser and the status of 
its recruits also vary over time, it 1s likely that these 
v&1"'lat1ons in the completeness of the data onphys1.clans are 
systematically correlated with either the status of Kaiser 
or the status of its recruits, or both. Thus, it 1s clear 
that bureaucratic changes in the format of the application 
forma introduced e. systematiob1as into the oompleteness of 
the data for the present study. 
However, it is unlikely that tras bias in the com-
pleteness of the data led to systematio coding errors. 
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Since all the app11cation forms \!h1ch had been used over the 
years were available, the vaI'lety of forms whioh had fre-
quently been filled out by a given phys1cian could be com-
pered. Instances of information missing on any given form 
could be identified and thus many potential coding errors 
avolded. 3 
For eX8~ple, the 1959 application form ofphyslcians 
who entered Kaiser bet""een 1955 and 1959 was compared to the 
torm which was used between 1955 fmd 1959. Although the 1959 
form was generally inoomplete, it was usually possible to 
find a complete form by loca·~ing the first form which had 
been filled out by these physicians. Similarly, several 
torms could be compared for physicians ,,-mo left Kaiser 
between 1952 and 1955. Thus, the inadequacy or ~ny partio-
ular form could be compensated tor to some extent. 
Although these comp(~laons eliminated many potential 
coding errors, some errors probably pould not be avoided. 
The information called for on both forms which were used 
priOl" to 1955 1s leas extensl ve than that on the forms used 
after 1955. Therefore, the l.nformat1on on physicians "lho 
3Actually, the neceoslty for comparing and mak1ng 
inferenoes from different forms may have led to some coding 
errors. The complexity and length of some of the physicians' 
careers plus the great amount of information to be compared 
before inferences could b~ made inevitably resulted in Borne 
errors. 
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t1lled out the former torme 1s probably less complete than 
the informat1on on physicians who filled out the latter 
torms. In sum, bureaucratic ohanges in the format of the 
app11cation forms have probably led to a slight systematic 
bias in t~e completeneos of the data tor this study. 
III. THIRD PROBLEM 
The third problem wh10h \V'ss discovered involved the 
misBing personnel recorda of the ten physicians l1ho left 
Kaiser before 1952.4 As a result of this problem, the pres-
ent study contains almost no data on these physicians. 
These missIng personnel records systematically bias 
the completeness of the data for this study. All the miss-
ing recorda come from the period 1943 to 1953 when Keiser had 
low status. In other words, the m1ssing records are cor-
related with the status of Ka1ser. As a result" the com-
pleteness of the data for this study is systematioally 
b1ased. 
4Although it is possible that records were not kept 
durlng the first years of Kaiser's operation, there 1s ev1-
(lance Which 1ndica.tes that recortts ~Tere kept and that the 
records on the physic1ans who left Kaiser before 1952 dis-
appeared. F1rst, complete information, including curricula 
vitae, letters of reference, and various early app11cation 
torms, was found for one physician who applied to and 
entered Kaiser around the end of 1945. Tnts suggests that 
written reoorda of some kind were kept even on the earl1est 
Kaiser physicians. Second, an informant repol'lted that m!-tny 
years ago all the records cn the Kaiser staff disappeared and 
that later only those of the active statf reappeared. The 
reoords of physicians who became inactive prior to 1952 we~e 
missing. 
r-
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The only l'ee,dily available alt ernatlve source of data 
on these physicians, the Am~r.!.2.£~._1-1~d1c?1 ~lr~ctor.l, con-
tained only one item of relevant informe.tion cn each physi-
clan, namely, hie medical school. Consequently, there.was 
no way to compensate tor the lack of data on these physi-
clans in the Kaiser personnel records. Therefore, many of 
our conclusions concerning physioians who entered Kaiser 
between 1943 and 1953 may be in error. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The three problems wh1ch l'rel"le raised by the use of the 
staft app11cation-s as a source of data for this study have 
now been described in tulle With regard to the first prob-
lem, which conoerned the bUl"eau.cratic use of the application 
forms, it was not possible to determirle definitely 1) 't..rhether 
it had led to systematic or random var1ation in the oomplete-
ness of the data and 2) whether it had led to systematic or 
random errors in the coding of the data. 
In oontrast, it was cleEU~ that the second and third 
problems, which involved bureaucratic changes in the format 
of the forms and ten mlssi~g personnel records, had produoed 
systemat1c var18.tlon in the completeness of the date.. How-
ever, only the missing personnel reoords may have led to 
errors in the data. In partioular, some of our conclusions 
concerning the physicians ~lho entered Kaiser from 1943 to 
1953 may be false. We conoluue that the validity of aome of 
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the results of this study is questionable. 
As a result of our discovery that the application 
torms did not provide systematic and complete 1nformation on 
each Kaiser phys1cian, the soundness of the decision to use 
these forms as a SOUI'ce of data for this study must be ques·-
tloned. If the present study could be done over aga1n, the 
staff appl1cations would not be chosen as the sole source ot 
data.. Rather, multiple SOUl~ces of data, e.g., the applica-
tion forms as well as curricula vitae, letters of referenoe, 
etc., would be used. The disadvantages of any part1cular 
source of data could then be identified and dealt ",·lth. 
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